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ABSTRACT
ECONOMIC ESSAYS ON HEALTH AND LOCATION
By
JOSEPH ANTHONY GARUCCIO
May, 2021
Committee Chair: Dr. Charles Courtemanche
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation is composed of three chapters that focus on the effect of one’s
environment on one’s health and healthcare decisions. Specifically, this work focuses on how
various policies and physical environments affect one’s potential access to care, one’s probability
of acquiring preventive care, and the spread of the novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19). In my
first chapter, I examine if Medicaid expansions induced new physicians to locate closer to poor
populations. I use precise physician location data and American Community Survey data at the
census block group level to identify the extent to which the expansions induced new physicians to
locate closer to poor populations. A goal of the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid expansions was
to increase healthcare access for low-income adults. I show that new physicians in expansion states
located increasingly closer to poor populations after expansion, arguably increasing their
healthcare access.
In my second chapter, I estimate the effect increases in urban sprawl in metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA) have on the probability individuals acquire timely preventive care. I make
use of Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data, an index of urban sprawl at the MSA
level, and the 1947 Interstate Highway Construction Plan to estimate the effect of increased sprawl.

In an instrumental variable design, I find that a standard deviation increase in sprawl lowers the
probability that individuals have various important cancer screenings and are more likely to be
obese. Such an increase also increases the probability of individuals obtaining flu shots.
In my third chapter, my coauthors and I estimate the effect social distancing policies had
on reducing the growth rate of COVID-19. We make use of daily, county-level confirmed case
and intervention data from Johns Hopkins University as well as state-level testing data to estimate
the effect of four key social distancing policies. We make use of an event-study design to
separately estimate the effect of shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs), bans on large gatherings, public
school closures, and restaurant and entertainment venue closures. We find that SIPOs and the
closure of restaurant and entertainment venues significantly reduced the growth rate. We found no
significant evidence that gathering bans nor school closures had a mitigating effect.
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INTRODUCTION
This body of work is comprised of three independent economic essays related to the effect
one’s environment has on one’s health and healthcare decisions. The goal of this dissertation is to
provide insight into the effects one’s physical and policy environment can have on one’s health. I
aim to shed light on how state and local policy can influence one’s health and healthcare decisions
as well as the effect urban environments can have on healthcare decisions. Specifically, I examine
the impacts of Medicaid expansions on new physician locations, urban sprawl on preventive care
use, and social distancing policies on the COVID-19 growth rate.
In my first chapter, I estimate the extent to which Medicaid expansions under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) led new physicians to locate closer to poor populations. Gains in
access to healthcare for low-income adults were a goal of the ACA. I approach access from a
spatial perspective and estimate the change in the proportion of poor individuals per 1,000
residents near new physician locations. The argument is, if new physicians locate closer to poor
populations, then those populations experience an increase in healthcare access. I make use of
precise physician location data and population data from the American Community Survey to
examine the changes in populations that new physicians locate near due to Medicaid expansions.
I find that within expansion states, new physicians located increasingly closer to poor populations
from 2014 to 2016. I do not find, however, any evidence that new physicians elected to enter
expansion states over non-expansion states and thereby reduce access in non-expansion states.
This suggests an increase in access for poor populations in expansion states without an
accompanying reduction for similar populations in non-expansion states.
In my second chapter, I estimate the effect increases in metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
urban sprawl has on preventive care use. Acquiring preventive care services can become more
1

inconvenient and costly as urban areas become more spread out, difficult to traverse, segregated
along residential and commercial lines, and have their economic activity more dispersed. To
examine this, I use preventive care use data from the 2012 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS) and a 2010 index of MSA level urban sprawl. I use the 1947 Highway
Construction Plan to instrument for levels of sprawl and estimate the effect of sprawl on the
probability of timely preventive care acquisition. I find that a one standard deviation increase in
sprawl tends to reduce the probability of individuals acquiring important preventive care,
particularly among cancer screening services. My results also suggest that greater sprawl increases
the probability of acquiring a flu shot and being obese.
In my third chapter, my coauthors and I estimate the effect social distancing policies had
on the novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) growth rate from March 1, 2020, to April 27, 2020.
States and localities imposed various social distancing measures within this time frame to combat
the spread of COVID-19 in the early stages of the pandemic. We used an event-study design to
examine the reducing effects of shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs), bans on large gatherings, public
school closures, and closures of restaurants and entertainment venues separately. We found
significant evidence that SIPOs and closures of restaurants and entertainment venues reduced the
COVID-19 growth rate. We found no significant evidence that either bans on large gatherings or
public-school closures affected the COVID-19 growth rate. Our results suggest the more imposing
social distancing measures had clear reducing effects. Alternatively, the results for gathering bans
and school closures were imprecise though possibly meaningful effects could not be ruled out.
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CHAPTER I: MEDICAID EXPANSIONS AND NEW PHYSICIAN LOCATIONS

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Among the primary goals of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to
create near-universal health insurance coverage in the United States (Gruber, 2011). The pursuit
of this goal involved a combination of mandates, public insurance expansions, and subsidies for
the purchase of private insurance. These various components were to work toward extending
coverage among underserved and largely uninsured populations in the U.S. The various policies,
implemented mostly in 2014, sought to improve “accessibility, affordability, and quality of care,”
particularly among the very sick as well as uninsured, low-income adults (Obama, 2016).
Historically, gaining health insurance has been perceived as gaining increased access to
healthcare. This may come through a combination of facing a reduced price for healthcare services
due to being insured and being perceived as a reliable payer by health care providers. All insurance
types, however, may not be considered equally appealing by physicians as compensation rates
vary, sometimes substantially, across insurance types (Berman et al., 2002, Zuckerman et al., 2012;
2014; 2017). Such differences have been thought to historically limit access to health care for
Medicaid enrollees, especially to physicians with established practices and patient rosters.
Physicians, even if willing to see new Medicaid patients, may only be able to accept a
limited number or provide them services at the cost of providing services to other patient types.
This would mean a tradeoff of access between patients of different insurance types. Additionally,
the location of physicians affects access. The further away a doctor is, the more difficult she is to
see. If established physicians are time-constrained or inconvenient to reach, then it is important to
understand how newly entering physicians respond to changes in public insurance coverage. If
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physicians are unable or unwilling to make themselves more available to newly insured Medicaid
enrollees, then the enrollees’ access to care may be far less than one would hope.
There is relatively little causal research examining the supply-side response to the ACA
and its effect on access. This paper’s primary contribution is to utilize rich, national data on
physicians that are particularly well suited to studying this issue from a geographic perspective. I
use difference-in-differences and event-study models to estimate the effect of Medicaid expansions
on physician entrants per 100,000 state population and on the population under the federal poverty
line (FPL) per 1,000 people near new physician locations. I use these two outcomes as spatial
measures of changes in access. Physicians being drawn to expansion states could indicate either a
desire to capture the pool of new customers or a hiring response from established practices facing
increased demand for their services. It would also suggest a potential loss of access if those
physicians would have served similar populations in non-expansion states. If new physicians are
willing to locate closer to lower-income populations post-expansion within states, then those
populations have arguably greater healthcare access.
The advantages of the data I use, which come from the National Plan and Provider
Enumeration System (NPPES), are the ability to precisely locate physicians and to focus
exclusively on gross entry. The latter advantage is an improvement over the use of public data
which provides net counts of physicians that combines new entrants with recent exits and makes
disentangling policy effects on either type difficult. I focus on the location decisions of postresidency (i.e. new) physicians across and within state lines.
In general, I do not find evidence that Medicaid expansions impacted new entrants per
100,000 state population among newly entering physicians. Rather, I find that doctors choose to
locate closer to low-income populations within expansion states. Pre-treatment coefficient
4

estimates from event study regressions generally support a causal interpretation of the results.
Taken together, these results suggest an increase in access for low-income adult populations in
expansion states that did not come at the expense of non-expansion states.
1.2 BACKGROUND
ACA Medicaid Expansion
With the implementation of the ACA, there were significant gains in health insurance for
the previously uninsured (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Frean et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al.,
2018a; Courtemanche et al., 2018b) and expansions of public health insurance led to increases in
health care demand and utilization (Baicker et al., 2013; Ghosh et al., 2017; Finkelstein et al.,
2012; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012a; Miller, 2012b; Simon et al., 2017; Wherry and
Miller, 2016). Simon et al. (2017) found increases in the probability that poor adults had a personal
physician due to Medicaid expansions. Ghosh et al.’s (2017) findings suggest greater prescription
drug access for chronic conditions among new Medicaid enrollees. These findings as well as others
point toward greater access to healthcare for the newly insured (Rhodes et al., 2017; Mazurenko
et al., 2017; Antonisse et al., 2018). The American Medical Association (AMA) reported
statistically significant increases in Medicaid patients as a share of average physicians’ patient mix
in expansion states in its Physician Practice Benchmark Surveys (Unlisted Staff Writer, 2017).
Neprash et al. (2018), however, found little to no increase in physician Medicaid participation due
to the Medicaid expansions and that Medicaid patients remained concentrated among relatively
few physicians. Additionally, mixed positive and null findings of the expansions’ effect on
preventive care usage suggest some limitations on access gains (Finkelstein et al., 2012;
Courtemanche et al. 2018b).
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Other research and a survey of Michigan doctors by the University of Michigan suggests
that the ACA insurance expansions led to longer initial wait times (Benitez et al., 2019) and less
time spent by physicians with patients (Garthwaite, 2012; Slowery et al., 2018). Rhodes et al.
(2017), however, did find wait time for appointments for the privately insured to be stable across
10 states in mid-2014 despite increased Medicaid enrollment. This suggests that established
physicians were not at their capacity constraints at this time, the tradeoff was being made with
Medicare patients, or that the tradeoff was in time spent with patients. Tipirneni et al.’s (2019)
post-Medicaid expansion survey of Michigan primary care providers (PCPs), however, did list
capacity as the most commonly reported factor influencing the acceptance of new Medicaid
patients. Those PCPs accepting new Medicaid patients tended to be female, minorities,
nonphysician providers, specialized in internal medicine, paid by salary, or working in practices
with Medicaid-predominant payer mixes (Tipirneni et al., 2019). Broadly, the evidence suggests
that there were tradeoffs in access made by time-constrained physicians. Such constraints and the
lack of a substantial change in Medicaid participation by practicing physicians means that the
decisions of newly entering physicians, who are less location-constrained than established
physicians, could be vital to ensuring access for newly insured populations.
On June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the expansion of Medicaid
programs was at the discretion of the states (KFF, 2012). This introduced the potential for
significant variation in state expansion decisions. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia
expanded Medicaid in 2014. However, the ACA allowed states to expand Medicaid before and
after 2014 and multiple states did so to some degree (Courtemanche et al., 2017). As noted earlier,
the expansions of public insurance brought significant gains in insurance coverage. According to
the Kaiser Family Foundation, before the implementation of the ACA, Medicaid and the
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Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) had just over 56.8 million enrollees across the United
States, and by the end of 2016, this number had swelled to just under 75 million (KFF, 2020).
The ACA not only generated a large increase in new enrollment via state Medicaid
expansions but also tried to incentivize physicians to be more willing to accept Medicaid enrollees.
The federal government fully sponsored a notable increase in Medicaid compensation for 146
primary care services (Maclean et al., 2018). Physicians who specialized in primary care or for
whom these services constituted a certain majority percentage of the services they provided
qualified for the increased compensation. This “fee bump” was a temporary, nationwide measure
lasting for the years 2013 and 2014. The federal government ultimately did not elect to continue
paying for this fee increase, and funding for it ended after December 2014 with an estimated cost
between 7 to 12 billion dollars (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2015). As
of July 2016, 19 states had decided to continue funding the fee increase fully or partially or extend
it to other specialties beyond primary care (Zuckerman et al., 2017).
Some evidence suggests that the fee bump increased access to healthcare (Polsky et al.,
2015; MACPAC, 2015; Rhodes et al., 2017; Alexander and Schnell, 2017), though other research
found little change in physicians’ acceptance of Medicaid (Decker, 2016; 2018). This picture is
one of increased access for Medicaid enrollees among physicians who already participated in
Medicaid (Neprash, 2018; Tipirneni 2019), with the primary care fee bump providing little
incentive for additional participation (Decker, 2016; 2018). This could lead to participating
providers hiring more physicians to address the additional demand which would be faced
disproportionately by them. Additionally, while established physicians may not be willing to
accept the costs of participating in Medicaid (Timbie et al., 2017), newly entering physicians may
be drawn to Medicaid as an arena in which there is less established provider competition.
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Zukerman and Goin (2012) show Medicaid-Medicare compensation ratios for various
medical services. A large majority of Medicaid programs compensate physicians less than
Medicare for their services and compensate primary care and other specialty services at different
relative rates. Excluding Tennessee, 34 of 49 states’ fee-for-service Medicaid programs
compensated other, non-obstetric services relatively higher than primary care. Among the other
states, 12 compensated primary care services relatively higher than other services, and four
compensated them at an equal ratio. These ratios do not reveal what specialties are paid more;
however, they show how close compensation for one insurance type is to another for various
services. All else equal, this shows if the two insurance types are close or remote substitutes in
compensation.
Similar data from 2016 showed that between 26 and 30 states fee-for-service programs
compensated other, non-obstetric services relatively higher (KFF 2016). The range arises from
certain states electing to continue the primary care fee bump in some fashion. These differences
suggest that primary care physicians may find new Medicaid enrollees less appealing than other
specialists during the sample period from 2011 to 2016. Primary care physicians may also face
greater competition from non-physician providers such as nurse practitioners and physician
assistants who can provide many of the same basic services (Van Vleet and Paradise 2015). To
explore potential response differences, I perform a subsample analysis for primary care physicians
and other specialists.
Existing Literature
There is a host of literature examining the location decisions of physicians. The broad
finding in this literature is that physician supply tends to respond to policy changes. Research
focusing on physician responses to tort reform, such as the capping of non-economic damages for
8

malpractice, finds that the implementation of these caps increases physician supply, particularly
in specialties most at risk of malpractice claims (Kessler, 2005; Klick and Stratmann, 2007; Matsa,
2007; Chou and Lo Sasso, 2009; Malani and Reif, 2015; Pesko et al., 2017; Chatterji et al., 2018).
However, there are dissenting opinions that find no effect of malpractice reform on supply (Paik
et al., 2016; Hyman et al., 2015). Some research suggests that the riskiest physicians in states may
sort undesirably into neighboring reform states (Leiber, 2014).
Research focusing on physicians’ urban-rural decisions finds that student loan forgiveness
programs increase the supply of physicians in rural counties (Kulka and McWeeny, 2017;
Falcetone, 2017). Within this literature, however, is evidence that physicians are somewhat
resistant to moving across state lines. Falcetone (2017) found that physicians prefer to locate near
their place of residency and relays the fact that 54 percent of physicians remain in their state of
residency for their first job. Taken together these literatures motivate my investigation of the effect
of the ACA Medicaid expansion on physician location decisions. On one hand, physicians seem
to be responsive to policy changes when it comes to location decisions. On the other hand, the
seeming distaste of physicians for Medicaid implies that incentives for relocating with respect to
this specific policy may not be particularly strong. Additionally, since physicians have a preference
for remaining within their state of residency, it is important to examine within-state location
decisions, not just cross-state decisions.
The Pathway to Becoming a Physician
The first step for future physicians after medical school is their residency training.
Residency lengths vary among specialties and can be as short as 3 years or as long as 7 years. If a
physician wants to sub-specialize, then they will need to apply for and accept sub-specialty training
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in what is called a fellowship. Most fellowships are an additional 1 to 2 years, however, some may
be 3 or 4 more years.1
To practice medicine independently, physicians in the U.S. must acquire a medical license
for their specialty in the state in which they practice. While medical licensure for physicians occurs
at the state level, there is a required national exam component. The other requirements can vary
but all states require applicants to have some amount of post-graduate training (residency), pass
their national exams, provide information about malpractice suits, and pay a fee to the state for
initial licensure and license renewal (Kocher, 2014). When a physician must acquire a license
varies. California requires licensure during residency; however, other states have not codified such
a requirement. In Georgia, at least some residents are given a grace period at the end of residency
to pursue licensure (Albano 2020). Following licensure, physicians pursue board certification.
Physicians cannot become board certified before completing residency. Residents typically search
for their first post-residency job during their final year of residency and most will start in their new
position mere weeks after completing their residency training (Darves, 2014). As residency years
typically end in June, this suggests there are few opportunities to adapt location decisions in the
six months leading up to the bulk of Medicaid expansions which occur in January.
1.3 DATA
Sources and Outcome Construction
I ask two questions in my analysis. The first is, did the Medicaid expansions change the
level of new physician entry in expansion states relative to non-expansion states? The second is,
did the Medicaid expansions induce new physicians to locate er to poor populations? To address

1

See: https://education.uwmedicine.org/pages/specialties-subspecialties/
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the first question, I construct a count of new physicians per 100,000 state population from a sample
of new physicians. This sample was extracted from the monthly publications of the National Plan
and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES), which contains the near universe of physicians, from
April 2011 to December 2016.2
To bill insurance and transmit health information protected under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), physicians in the US were required to obtain a unique
numeric identifier known as a national provider identifier (NPI) by May 23, 2008. Registration has
no monetary cost and is compulsory for insurance reimbursement. Therefore, the NPI registry
contains the near universe of licensed physicians and other entities that directly bill insurance or
transmit protected data. Individuals and organizations have separate NPIs that allow for unique
identification. In 2013, the CMS began requiring the use of an NPI when writing prescriptions,
making it even more difficult for a physician to avoid having one.
Each month of NPPES data contains physicians’ unique identifier, their primary practice
location at the street level, and their current, precise specialty (taxonomy code). This data does not
contain demographic nor other individual information outside of sex and sole proprietor status. By
CMS guidelines, resident physicians are only to change their taxonomy code from that of a student
trainee to that of a physician after they are licensed. Therefore, those with physician taxonomy
codes in the NPPES represent the near universe of licensed physicians. I observe the point of
licensure for those who make this change during my sample period; however, the completion of
residency is not provided. Figure 1. shows the national level count of licensed allopathic and
osteopathic physicians observed in this data. The December 2016 count of these physicians in

2

January to March of 2011 was not available from the data source and May 2013 was also missing.
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Figure 1 is just over 908,000. For contrast, Young et al. (2017) counted 953,695 allopathic and
osteopathic physicians by the end of 2016 using data from the Federation of State Medical Boards.
My count makes up over 95% of the physician count found by Young et al. (2017). The doctors
used in my analysis also include podiatrists and optometrists. Their inclusion brings the count of
doctors to just over 978,000 by the end of 2016.
FIGURE 1: COUNT OF ALLOPATHIC AND OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS IN NPPES

Note: May 2013 is missing from my dataset.

Given that licensure can occur during residency, the date of licensure cannot reliably be
used to identify new physician entry. To identify the date of entry, I follow Falcetone (2017) and
utilize the CMS’s Medicare Physician Compare. Medicare Physician Compare provides
information on physicians and medical groups that participate in Medicare. While this data set
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does not contain all physicians, it does contain participating physicians’ NPI and their year of
graduation from medical school. The Year of entry can, therefore, be identified by adding the years
of required training for a specialty to the year of graduation. Employing this method, I constructed
my sample’s annual state-level count of entering physicians per 100,000 state population. I
aggregate entries to the year level as sparsely populated states do not always have a physician enter
every month. As a precaution, I examined my prospective entrants years later in the NPPES’
publication for June of 2020. If an individual identified as a potential entrant did not have a
physician’s taxonomy code in 2020 or became a sub-specialist after my sample period, then I
removed them from my sample. This avoids conflating post-training entrants with those who did
not remain a physician or did not complete their fellowship training during the sample period. This
removed less than 4.5 percent of potential entrants.
To examine if the Medicaid expansions induced doctors to locate closer to poor
populations, I estimate the number of individuals under the federal poverty line (FPL) per 1000
population residing within twenty, ten, and five miles of a new entrant’s location. The maximum
size of this radius comes from research in the states of Kentucky and Washington. One paper found
that about 82% of patients traveled less than 20 miles for their healthcare visit (Cashion et al.,
2013). The other found that surveyed adults would be willing to travel just over 20 miles on
average for routine care, though average trips at the time were considerably shorter (Yin, 2013).
I infer the general population and those under the federal poverty line near physician
locations using American Community Survey (ACS) data at the census block group level; which
is the lowest level geography publicly available. I utilize the five-year files for the ACS, which are
one percent national samples for each year and the only files which publish census block group
data. I assume the data best represents the middle year of each five-year period from 2009-2018.
13

There is limited information offered at the census block group level given that some groups
have very small population sizes. I infer the number of individuals under the FPL living in each
block group using block group population, number of households in each block group, and the
number of households in various income categories. Taking the average household size and
assuming households are uniformly distributed within income categories, I estimate the population
under or at the poverty line in each block group. Figure 2. plots the annual poverty rate I infer
alongside that reported by the Census Bureau using Current Population Survey’s (CPS) data
(Semega et al., 2017).
FIGURE 2: INFERRED PERCENT IN POVERTY

My inferred percentage is consistently about one percentage point higher than the CPS but
tracks it very well. Assuming each census block group’s population lives in its centroid, I construct
14

the number of individuals under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within twenty,
ten, and five miles of each entering physician’s location. Table 1. displays a table of summary
statistics for the aggregate state and individual level outcomes by pre and post-expansion periods.
TABLE 1: CHAPTER I SUMMARY STATISTICS
State Entries Per 100K Population
All Doctors
Primary Care
Other Specialties
Population Under FPL Per 1,000 Near Physician
Location
Within 20 Miles
All Doctors
Primary Care
Other Specialties
Within 10 Miles
All Doctors
Primary Care
Other Specialties
Within 5 Miles
All Doctors
Primary Care
Other Specialties

Mean (20122013)
2.60
1.10
1.50

Mean (20142016)
2.77
1.16
1.60

Mean (20122013)

Mean (20142016)

167.04
167.71
166.57

154.40
155.86
153.39

184.75
185.73
184.07

169.85
171.11
168.99

204.02
208.38
200.99

188.13
190.83
186.27

Note: 2011 is excluded here as the physician data begins in April of that year. Its inclusion would reduce the pre-period state
entry means due to this. For consistency, 2011 is excluded in the doctor level means as well.

Data Limitations
There are limitations to using Medicare Physician Compare to identify entry and the
NPPES’s primary practice location for physicians. Pediatricians, returning physicians, and
foreign-born physicians are likely underrepresented in my sample. Pediatricians do not tend to
participate in Medicare and relatively few appear in the Physician Compare data. Physicians who
return from an extended break from practice or who are foreign-born enter on non-traditional
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timelines. Both types require additional training to be licensed and basing entry on graduation year
likely excludes the majority of these physicians. The Medicaid expansions were designed,
however, to increase healthcare access for poor adults and the sample’s lack of pediatricians is less
concerning than it might be in other circumstances. I exclude those that do appear in Physician
Compare from my sample as my concern is about poor adult access to care.
The effect of omitting returning physicians is ambiguous as there is little research on
returning physicians. It has been estimated that around 10,000 physicians could return to practice
each year; however, there is little information on how many do return and in what specialties
(AMA Reentry Fact Sheet, 2011).3 The omission of foreign-born physicians, on the other hand,
likely leads to conservative results. Around twenty-five percent of physicians practicing in the US
have medical degrees from foreign countries, and evidence suggests that most of these physicians
are not US citizens (AIC, 2018). This report finds that foreign-trained physicians constitute nearly
one-third of doctors practicing in areas where at least 30 percent of the population are at the federal
poverty level. This suggests the omission of these doctors’ location choices will lead to understated
levels of low-income individuals near entering physician locations.
The benefit of having a precise location for each physician’s primary practice location is
limited by the fact that physicians may practice at multiple locations. The NPPES does not track
nor require physicians to report all locations of practice. The effect this may have is ambiguous
and depends on where else physicians may practice. If a physician’s additional practice locations
are in higher-income areas, then results implying increased access for low-income populations
would be overstated. A similar argument could be made for an understated or unaffected result.

3

The year is not listed on the sheet, however another source mentions that the study providing this number is from
2011, see: https://khn.org/news/for-doctors-who-take-a-break-from-practice-coming-back-can-be-tough/
Last accessed: 7/31/2020
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There is not an obvious means to address this limitation and I rely on the assumption that the
majority of each physician’s time is spent at their primary practice location.
1.4 METHODS
I employ difference-in-differences (DiD) and event-study specifications in both my cross
and within-state choice analyses. The examination of cross-state location choices determines if the
Medicaid expansions induced differential sorting. If the composition of state entrants changed after
expansions, then the interpretation of within-state results needs to acknowledge this change. My
preferred specification uses only the 40 states which expanded in January 2014 or did not expand
before 2017. I exclude those states which expanded earlier or later in my sample period. I do not
have pre-expansion data for early expansion states. My sample period from April 2011 to
December 2016 and I cannot examine any response to these early expansions. Further, the late
expansion states have long pre-expansion periods and short post-expansion periods (one as short
as six months). This introduces potentially unwanted variation in pre and post-expansion results
due to changes in number and type of contributing states. There is a growing literature that
expresses concerns about the legitimacy of event-study results and pre-trend tests when the timing
of treatment is heterogeneous (Sun and Abraham 2020). My preferred specification avoids this
concern and creates balance in the periods before and after expansion supporting a more causal
interpretation of results. My cross-state decision DiD specification is as follows
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝑒𝑟_100𝐾_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 𝝀 + 𝝉𝑡 + 𝜸𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡

(1)

where 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝑒𝑟_100𝐾_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the count of all entering physicians or a specific group of
physicians in state i in year t per 100,000 state population, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 is an indicator equal
to 1 if state i has expanded its Medicaid program in year t or years prior and 0 otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a
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vector of state-level controls4 for state i in year t, 𝝉𝑡 and 𝜸𝑖 are year and state fixed effects
respectively, and µ𝑖𝑡 is the error term.
The event study specification closely resembles equation (1) and is as follows
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 100𝐾 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝑘(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 x 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘 )𝝓 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 𝝀 + 𝝉𝑡 + 𝜸𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡

(2)

𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 is an indicator equal to 1 if state i expanded Medicaid in January of 2014. Yeark
is an indicator for a given year such that k ϵ {2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016}, leaving 2013 as the
comparison year.
My within-state decision specification is very similar to that of my cross-state and is as
follows
𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑃𝐿 𝑃𝑒𝑟 1000 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝑿𝒌𝒕 𝝀 + 𝛿1 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝝉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜸𝑗𝑘 + 𝜺𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡

(3)

Where 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑃𝐿 𝑃𝑒𝑟 1000 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is the population under the federal poverty
line per 1000 population living within 20, 10, or 5 miles of doctor i of type j in state k in year t.
𝑿𝒌𝒕 remains a vector of state-level controls, femaleijkt indicates if the entrant is female, the fixed
effects are now year by doctor type (primary care, surgery, and other specialties) and state by
doctor type respectively.
The event study specification for states which expanded in 2014 is as follows

4

These controls include state-level means of race, education, insured levels, income, and population. Additionally, I
control for whether states kept the primary care fee pump in any fashion and had any policy changes affecting
malpractice.
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𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑃𝐿 𝑃𝑒𝑟 250 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝑘(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 x 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘 )𝝅 +
𝑿𝒌𝒕 𝝀 + 𝒁𝒊𝒕 𝜹 + 𝝉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜸𝑗𝑘 + 𝜺𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡

(4)

where the year before expansion is again used as the reference year.
1.5 RESULTS
Results
Table 2 displays the difference-in-differences estimates for my preferred cross-state
decision specification. Figure 3 displays the cross-state event study for all physician types, primary
care, and other specialties. Tables for these event studies can be found in Appendix A in Table
A.1. I find little evidence that the Medicaid expansions induced changes in physician entries per
100,000 state population. The 95 percent confidence intervals for the difference-in-differences
results, however, do not rule out potentially meaningful effects. The interval for all physician types
includes effects ranging from a 13.7 percent decrease in physicians entering expansion states to an
11.1 percent increase. The event-study results in Figure 3 also do not suggest meaningful changes
in the state-level entry for any doctor type, however, the possibility of such changes cannot be
entirely ruled out.
Table 3 shows the difference-in-differences estimates for my preferred within-state
specification. Figure 4 displays the within-state event studies for radii of twenty, ten, and five miles
respectively. The table of these results can be found in Appendix B, Table A.2. As the radius
tightens around those living nearest physicians, a clear pattern emerges. I find significant evidence
that all physician types chose to locate closer to poor populations in expansion states. The fivemile radius results for all physician types suggest the population under the federal poverty line per
1,000 residents near new physician locations increased by 3.6 percent relative to the pre-expansion
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mean in the first year of expansion, 4.9 percent in the second year, and 7.9 percent in the third
year. Figure 5 displays the sub-sample event studies for primary care and other specialties. The
results for primary care are insignificant in the first two years but suggest an increase of 7.3 percent
in the third year. The results for the other specialties suggest increases of 4.3 percent in the first
year, 4.9 percent in the second, and 8.3 percent in the third. These results imply that newly entering
physicians located increasingly closer to poor populations in expansion states over time.
TABLE 2: CROSS-STATE DID - ENTRANTS PER 100K STATE POPULATION
Variables
Medicaid Expansion

State FE
Year FE
Observations

All Doctors
-0.0339
(0.1597)
x
x
240

Primary Care
-0.0348
(0.0983)
x
x
240

Other Specialties
0.0010
(0.0930)
x
x
240

Note: The outcome of interest is the state-level count of new entries per 100,000 state population. Other controls include state-level
demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state and
year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the state level (+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***
p<0.001).
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Robustness
Figures 6, and 7 examine the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of states by expansion
timing. They explore the potential concern that excluding populous states like California, in which
many physicians begin practice, may significantly influence results. Excluding the early and late
expanding states reduced the sample by nearly 9,000 entrants which is almost 25 percent of all
entrants in the sample. Just over 3,000 of those excluded entrants started practice in California.
Figure 6 displays three event studies for all physician types which include the addition of early
expanding states to the preferred set, of later expanding states, and the use of all states. Consistent
with the preferred set, the inclusion of early expanders, late expanders, or all states in the crossstate analysis does not result in any statistically significant findings. This suggests that cross-state
results are not driven by state exclusions.
Figure 7 displays similar event studies for the within-state analysis. The within-state results
are largely robust to the inclusion of early and late expansion states. Following Courtemanche et
al. (2017) I assume that the full expansion for early expansion states occurred in January of 2014.
Figure 7 displays the five-mile, event-study results for all doctor types with the inclusion of early
expanders, late expanders, all states, and all states except Michigan. The inclusion of early
expansion states does little to change the post-expansion results, however, a significant pre-trend
appears in 2011. This trend does not persist in 2012 but could suggest a response to early
expansions in 2010 and 2011. A lack of data before 2011 prohibits further exploration.
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TABLE 3: WITHIN-STATE DID
Panel 1. 5 Mile Radius

All Docs
(5 mi.)

Medicaid Expansion

6.5248**

4.6286

8.6457*

(2.1100)

(4.7646)

(3.4059)

x

x

x

x

30243

12353

17890

All Docs
(10 mi.)

Primary Care
(10 mi.)

Other. Spec.
(10 mi.)

3.1119+

-0.4109

5.9858**

(1.6557)

(3.8391)

(1.7873)

x

x

x

x

30254

12360

17894

All Docs
(20 mi.)

Primary Care
(20 mi.)

Other. Spec.
(20 mi.)

1.8718

0.2873

3.1118+

(1.9714)

(3.1234)

(1.7254)

Year FE

x

x

State FE

x

x

12361

17894

Year FE
State FE
Year x Doctor Type FE

x

State x Doctor Type FE

x

Observations

Panel 2. 10 Mile Radius
Medicaid Expansion

Year FE
State FE
Year x Doctor Type FE

x

State x Doctor Type FE

x

Observations

Panel 3. 20 Mile Radius
Medicaid Expansion

Year x Doctor Type FE

x

State x Doctor Type FE

x

Observations

30255

Primary Care
(5 mi.)

Other. Spec.
(5 mi.)

Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 20, 10, and 5 miles
of newly entering physicians. Other controls include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for
malpractice reform and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state by physician type and year by physician type fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the state level ( + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001)
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FIGURE 3: CROSS-STATE EVENT STUDY – ENTRIES PER 100K POPULATION

Note: The outcome of interest is the state-level count of new entries per 100,000 state population. Explanatory variables of interest
are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other controls include state-level demographics, education,
unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state and year fixed effects. 2013 is
the comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.
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FIGURE 4: WITHIN-STATE EVENT STUDY: 20, 10, AND 5 MILE RADIUS

Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 20, 10, and 5 miles
of newly entering physicians. Explanatory variables of interest are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other
controls include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee
bump was kept, and state by doctor group (primary care or other specialists) and year by doctor group type fixed effects. 2013 is
the comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.
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FIGURE 5: SUB-SAMPLE ANALYSIS – PRIMARY CARE AND OTHER SPECIALISTS

Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 5 miles of newly
entering physicians. Explanatory variables of interest are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other controls
include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was
kept, and state by doctor group (primary care or other specialists) and year by doctor group type fixed effects. 2013 is the
comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.

The inclusion of late expansion states introduces more heterogenous timing in expansions
and produces noisier results. The results are similar to my preferred results for those years shared
by all included states (three years prior through the year of expansion). In the shared periods, there
are no significant pre-trends and there are significant increases in the year of expansion. The results
for the subsequent expansion years are suggestive of increases but are insignificant. The use of all
states presents a similar story, suggesting that the noisiness of post-expansion results is driven by
the inclusion of late-expanding states. The exclusion of Michigan, which expanded in April of
2014, addresses this lack of precision and provides results similar to my preferred specification.
While it is reassuring that statistical imprecision is not systemic to all late expanding states, the
source of it in Michigan cannot be explained by this analysis.
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FIGURE 6: CROSS-STATE EVENT STUDIES – VARYING STATE INCLUSIONS

Note: The outcome of interest is the state-level count of new entries per 100,000 state population. Explanatory variables of interest
are interactions between Medicaid expansion status years relative to expansion. For early expansion states, January of 2014 is
assumed to be the official expansion date. Other controls include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators
for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state and year fixed effects. 2013 is the comparison year and
graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.
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FIGURE 7: WITHIN-STATE EVENT STUDIES – VARYING STATE INCLUSIONS

Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 5 miles of newly
entering physicians. Explanatory variables of interest are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other controls
include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was
kept, and state by doctor group (primary care or other specialists) and year by doctor group type fixed effects. 2013 is the
comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.

1.6 DISCUSSION
My findings suggest healthcare access increased for low-income populations within
expansion states without reducing access in non-expansion states. The broad ACA literature
suggests access increased to those physicians already participating in Medicaid but physician
participation did not change. This places increased importance on new physician decisions. If
Medicaid expansions had induced new physicians to enter expansion states over non-expansion
states, then it likely would have been those predisposed to serving Medicaid patients. This could
have led to undesirable access tradeoffs among low-income populations. In such a case, the gain
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in the probability of low-income adults in expansion states having a personal physician (Simon et
al., 2017), might have come at the expense of similar populations in non-expansion states. Finding
only within-state effects suggests expansion states increased access without negatively impacting
their non-expansion neighbors. Therefore, findings of increased prescription drug access for
chronic conditions (Ghosh et al., 2017) would not be diminished by accompanying access tradeoffs
in non-expansion states.
I find somewhat smaller and less precise estimates for primary care physicians relative to
other specialists. This could be due to a somewhat smaller sample or to differences in relative
compensation rates. For a majority of states non-primary care, non-obstetric services are
compensated at a higher relative rate (Zukerman and Goin 2012; KFF 2016). The weaker results
among newly entering primary care physicians could be due to a relatively weaker financial
incentive to serve Medicaid enrollees. It could also be due to greater competition for these
populations from non-physician PCPs (Tiperneni et al. 2019).
I find physicians’ location decisions are responsive to changes in Medicaid, but only within
their chosen state of practice. This may be because physicians prefer to stay within their state of
residency (Falcetone, 2017) and the relatively low compensation offered by Medicaid was unable
to overcome this preference (Zuckerman et al.; 2012, 2014, 2017). The malpractice reform
literature finds state-level effects on physician supply, sometimes only for at-risk specialties, using
area-level counts or post-residency decisions from a single state (Chatterji et al., 2018). My
sample, while unlikely to be representative, is national and uses only entrants. This reduces the
risk of results being influenced by physician exit or being highly localized. Figure 1 shows a
declining poverty rate in the US from 2014 to 2016 for both my inferred rate and the CPS measure.
This suggests my results are not driven by changes in poverty but by changes in location decisions.
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This work contributes to a sparse literature on supply-side responses to the ACA and the
wider literature on physician location decisions. My results support demand-side research
suggesting increased healthcare access. They imply the supply-side response was to reallocate
entrants within states to accommodate the increased demand from expanded Medicaid. It also
demonstrates a need for additional supply-side research as estimates of access changes require a
fuller understanding of both supply and demand responses.
This paper brings a novel, national dataset to bear on an underexplored area of research
and indicates valuable future work to be done. My results are suggestive of increased access but
do not address physician persistence in their post-residency location. If physicians remain in their
post-residency location for extended periods, then my results suggest increasing access over time
for low-income populations. However, if they move on quickly to serve high-income areas and are
merely being replaced by new entrants, then access increased in a more limited fashion.
My work is policy informative and provides insight into the effect of Medicaid expansions.
However, a limitation is that it does not comment on the cost-effectiveness of increases in access.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the costs and benefits of changes in access.
Nevertheless, research on insurance expansions in the US remains relevant as the national debate
on the form health insurance and healthcare should take is ongoing. My work suggests that the
observed gains in access in expansion states came in the most preferred form. Expansion states
increased healthcare access for low-income populations without evidence of damaging their nonexpansion neighbors. While I do not suggest that physicians will never be induced to locate across
state lines by changes in Medicaid policy, my results suggest that Medicaid policy may be a means
of addressing access disparities within states without damaging one’s neighbors. Policy has
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changed with administrations over time and is likely to change again in the future. This creates a
need for continued, causal research to inform the decisions of policymakers.
CHAPTER II: URBAN SPRAWL AND PREVENTIVE CARE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Common aspects of the United States’ metropolitan areas that affect their populations,
affect a majority of the nation as urban areas contain nearly eighty percent of the country’s
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). As urban areas expand, so too do the activities performed
in environments almost entirely manmade. The layout of cities’ systems of roads, the location of
businesses and residences, the existence and routes of public transportation, and all other amenities
come together to give an urban area its form. Given the population living within urban areas,
understanding their form’s influence on residents’ health, labor markets, socioeconomic
distributions, and other outcomes are of interest to researchers and policymakers. This work
contributes to the urban form and health-related research by estimating the impact of urban sprawl
on the probability one obtains certain, recommended preventive care services.
As a city expands and shopping centers, subdivisions, commercial centers, and other types
of development are built, they are often constructed with their own parking lots, parking structures,
driveways, lawns, offices, living space, and more paved roads and black-topped areas. The added
space used for living, working, and entertaining tends to reduce the population per given square
unit of distance in an area. If the urban form is significantly spread out, then it is often called
sprawling. In a broad sense, urban sprawl can be thought of as “the process in which the spread
of development across the landscape far outpaces population growth” (Ewing et al 2014). In this
case, people and places are further apart and travel between locations may require additional time
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and costs on average. The degrees to which metropolitan areas are traversable, allocated for
particular uses, have concentrated economic centers, and populations are distributed across space
provide the common measures of sprawl. How traversable (grid-like) a metropolitan area may be
is also used as a measure of sprawl, though, perhaps less commonly than the other three.
In areas that are sprawled, one’s ability to travel by other means than by car may become
more inhibited and inconvenient. People who live in cities and depend on public transportation
may not be offered a route that takes them to suburban areas where their doctor may be located or
they may find that a bus or train traveling to that area runs infrequently. Even if the travel time
remains unchanged to a preferred health facility's location, switching from taking the train to a car
can impose higher costs. Among other scenarios, higher costs arise when an equidistant train trip
is cheaper than driving, when one does not own a car and must hire one, or when one has purchased
an unlimited train pass and using a car is an additive cost. As costs and inconvenience rise,
individuals may forgo certain trips including those for medical services that do not seem urgent.
Ewing et al. (2014) found that urban sprawl is associated with greater amounts of driving,
pollution, vehicle accidents, and reduced use of alternatives to driving such as walking. Other
research found that reduced population and housing density are correlated with increased driving
times to primary care providers in Orlando (Bejleri et al. 2016). This suggests that sprawl likely
imposes higher average travel costs. The question this paper asks is, does this greater urban sprawl
decrease the probability of acquiring preventive care?
2.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Preventive care may be the area of medical care expected to respond most strongly to
sprawl levels. Preventive care may be thought of as optional care by an average individual. These
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are services that people receive proactively while feeling healthy to head off potential, future health
problems and remain healthy. These services are unlikely to be viewed as being as much of a
necessity when compared to services that one seeks for an illness. Their probability of use may,
therefore, be more sensitive to how burdensome a service is to acquire. Sprawl’s expected effect
on medical care usage when one is ill is more ambiguous. On one hand, it seems plausible for
increased inconvenience to reduce the usage of care for prevention and the treatment of illness. On
the other hand, care for illnesses may be utilized more if there is a decline in preventive care usage
that translates into a higher rate of manifested illnesses requiring treatment. For this reason, I focus
on preventive care, as it is plausibly affected in only a single direction.
The decision to forgo services rests on how preventive care is valued relative to its cost of
acquisition. The value of preventive care can be discussed from two points of view. One point of
view evaluates preventive care in terms of cost-effectiveness (Maciosek, 2006; Maciosek 2017).
From this perspective, the value of a given service is based on whether the estimated cost of the
prevention is cheaper than treating the illness itself. This is an important consideration for those
who bear the cost of medical bills such as health insurers. This manner for valuating preventive
care, however, is unlikely to be shared by individuals. Grossman (1972) relates that there is value
in and of one’s health and, to that extent, there is value in investing to improve or maintain one’s
health. All other things equal, people prefer to be well rather than ill, which necessitates a value
difference. Pure cost-effectiveness at the individual level disregards the value of one’s health in
the well and sick state. If preventive treatment is cost-neutral, people are unlikely to be indifferent
between the well state which preventive care preserves and the sick state which may arise in its
absence.
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The urban form for metropolitan residents influences the costs they face in obtaining
preventive care. For some suburban residents, care may less costly if facilities have located near
them. On average, however, the more separated and spread out things are, the more costly and
inconvenient obtaining care becomes. It seems sensible to expect that as the cost of obtaining
preventive services rises, the probability of forgoing them increases. One study found that elderly
people in sprawling suburban areas are more likely to be treated for ambulatory care sensitive
conditions that are considered preventable with preventive care (Mobley et al. 2006a). Other
research has found that added distance to a hospital does reduce the probability that central city
black children have a checkup by about three percent (Currie and Reagen 2003). These findings
suggest that at least for some, the cost of preventive care is affected by one’s environment and
provides motivation for additional research.
2.3 RELEVANT LITERATURE: SPRAWL AND HEALTH
The majority of urban form and health research focuses on areas other than preventive care
and finds largely negative health effects of sprawl. One study found that sprawl is associated with
higher risks of traffic fatalities, particularly for pedestrians (Ewing et al. 2003b). Another claimed
that increased urban sprawl is associated with longer emergency medical service response times
and delayed ambulance arrivals (Trowbridge et al. 2009). These studies imply health risks are part
of the higher costs that sprawl can impose through greater car use. This may be especially higher
among the elderly as they are more likely to cause traffic accidents than non-elderly adults and use
ambulances (Loughran et al. 2007; Albert et al. 2013).
Other studies look at a broad set of links between sprawl and health, including heart health.
A small number of studies have attempted to link between urban sprawl and coronary heart disease.
These studies, however, have mixed results and generally seem to find no effect. Of those papers,
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two find an association between urban sprawl and coronary heart disease in women (Mobley et al.
2006b; Griffin et al. 2012); while Ewing et al. (2003a) found sprawl be associated with higher
rates of hypertension.
The research focused on sprawl’s impact on food access and obesity has found stronger
results. Christian (2010) found a negative correlation between sprawl and food insecurity. Ewing
et al. (2003a) found that increases in sprawl are associated with less leisure time walking and
higher rates of obesity. Other studies found a similar association between sprawl and obesity
(Vandegraft and Yorked 2004), while another found that increased driving time was associated
with an increased probability of obesity (Frank et al. 2004).
The findings on obesity, however, were somewhat disputed and then reaffirmed by later
literature. Some research suggested that people with high body max index measures tend to choose
to live in high sprawl areas, which casts doubt on a causal link between sprawl and obesity
(Plantinga and Bernell 2007). Similar correlational research claimed that there was no link at all
between sprawl and obesity once time-invariant, unobserved characteristics were accounted for
(Eid et al. 2008). Later causal research, however, found that had the proportion of the population
living in dense areas not declined in the average metropolitan area from 1970-2000, then obesity
would have been reduced by about 13% (Zhao and Kaestner 2010).
2.4 DATA
Preventive Care Outcomes
To estimate the effect greater MSA sprawl has on acquiring certain preventive care services
within medically recommended time windows, I use Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) data from 2012 and an MSA sprawl index from 2010. The BRFSS contains survey data
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on respondents’ use of preventive care services. The examined services such as breast, cervical,
and colorectal cancer screenings and influenza vaccinations, are among those prioritized by the
National Commission on Preventive Priorities (Maciosek et al. 2017). Other outcomes include
biannual checkups and whether respondents have a personal doctor. The 2012 survey is used as
questions are reflective of services received in past years and would include 2010 sprawl levels.
The BRFSS data is used to create binary variables that take the value one if respondents acquired
a given service within the recommended time window and zero otherwise. Table 4 displays the
timing recommendations for the various services.
TABLE 4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTIVE CARE SERVICES
Service

Timing

Recommending Body

1-2 Years

American Medical Association*5

Yearly

Center for Disease Control

Mammograms

1-2 Years (Ages 45+)

American Cancer Society

Breast Exams

Yearly (40+), 1-3 Years(20-39)

American Cancer Society

Pap Smears

Every 3-5 years (21+)

Mayo Clinic

Colon/Sigmoidoscopies

Every 10 years (50+)

American Cancer Society

Routine Checkups
Flu Shots

While the BRFSS is a nationally representative survey, the full BRFSS is not necessarily
MSA representative. This means that decisions concerning data usage and weighting needed to be
made carefully. An alternative that was considered in place of the full BRFSS was the BRFSS
SMART. The BRFSS SMART is another dataset offered by the CDC that focuses on MSAs.
Unfortunately, it has a minimum response requirement to include data on a particular MSA in a
given year. This excludes considerable MSAs that are less populous than others. These exclusions
leave a restrictive subset of very similar MSAs in terms of sprawl characteristics and greatly
reduced the variation off of which I aim to identify the effect of sprawl. I ultimately use the full

5

The American Medical Association has not endorsed yearly checkups in more recent years.
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BRFSS given the restrictiveness in the SMART data and apply MSA population weights in place
of the BRFSS weights. Table 5 provides summary statistics for the BRFSS data I use as control
variables or to construct control variables. There are negligible differences between my
unweighted subsample and the full, unweighted BRFSS.
TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SUB-SAMPLE
Variable

Full BRFSS Sample

Age

MSA Sub-Sample
54.54

53.88

White

73.63%

76.68%

Black

11.66%

11.64%

1.97%

1.96%

Female

59.65%

58.30%

Married

51.80%

52.54%

Highschool Diploma

26.21%

25.34%

Some College

27.14%

27.28%

4+ Years of College

38.87%

40.21%

10k < Income < 15k

5.59%

5.53%

15k < Income < 20k

7.45%

7.40%

20k < Income < 25k

8.97%

8.94%

25k < Income < 35k

10.65%

10.63%

35k < Income < 50k

14.07%

14.10%

50k < Income < 75k

15.79%

15.85%

Income > 75k

32.09%

32.23%

Employed for Wages

43.37%

45.88%

7.69%

7.94%

Retired

27.15%

25.40%

Has Any Health Insurance

88.61%

88.60%

Asian (Non-Pacific Isl.)

Self-Employed

Measure of Sprawl
The measures of urban sprawl come from a 2010 index of urban sprawl made available by
Ewing et al. (2014)6 7. An older version of this index was used by Christian (2010). I use this
sprawl index at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level and have measures for 205 MSAs in

6
7

Index can be obtained at: https://gis.cancer.gov/tools/urban-sprawl/
Due to data collection difficulties, measures for Massachusetts are not included in this sprawl index.
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44 states8. Ewing et al. (2014) calculate their measures of sprawl using four factors. Theses factors
are in turn, the composition of multiple variables that can be associated with each factor. The
factors are population density, mixed land use, economic centering, and street accessibility. A
more sprawled MSA is associated with lower population densities, more segregated land use, more
dispersed economic activity, and more convoluted street systems. Greater detail on what variables
are used to construct the values of each factor can be found in Ewing et al (2014) or to a lesser
degree in this chapter’s appendix discussion.
The measure of each factor was constructed at the county level for around 1000 counties
and was standardized to have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 25. This mean and standard
deviation largely holds when aggregating to the MSA level. The index also provides a composite
score that is the equally-weighted average of the pre-standardized factors. As the individual factor
measures are standardized and rounded, I cannot replicate the composite measure.
The Instrumental Variable: The 1947 Highway Construction Plan
To address the concern that contemporaneous use of preventive care services and the level
of sprawl of one’s home MSA may be correlated with unobserved preferences, I instrument for
sprawl using the 1947 highway construction plan. I use a similar method to that used by BaumSnow (2007) and Zhao and Kaestner (2010), though in a static setting. Baum-Snow (2007)
examined the effect highways had on suburbanization; a term sometimes used in place of urban
sprawl. To address the endogeneity of contemporaneous choices of where governments build roads
and where people elect to live, Baum-Snow used the 1947 federal interstate highway plan as an
instrument for contemporaneous highway construction. The plan was designed to connect distant,

8

States for which I do not have obesevations or do not have sprawl measures are: AK, DE, DC, HI, MA, MT, WY
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major United States cities for the sake of national defense. The building of the interstate highway
system was approved by the federal government in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944. The
legislation required the plan to have highways “…so located as to connect by routes as direct as
practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers, to serve the national
defense, and to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance in the
Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico…."9
The argument for the instrument is that the planned location of highways is correlated with
the location of current highways but is uncorrelated with unobserved contemporaneous preferences
for highway location. Baum-Snow found that in the decades from the 1950s to the 1990s the
population in central cities diminished by 17%, despite population growth in metropolitan areas of
72%. The key factor that drove this suburbanization was the construction of interstate highways
through important American cities (Baum-Snow 2007). The plan predates my first year of data by
63 years and was meant to link cities for the sake of national defense and not for people to move
to the suburbs nor enable (inhibit) their getting colonoscopies in the mid to late 2000s. On the
surface, it seems likely that this instrument can address the endogeneity concern embedded in the
selection of modern highway locations and their effect on sprawl and health care choices.
I construct my instrument using a map of the 1947 plan which can be seen in Figure B.1 of
Appendix C. Using the map, I created a count of highway rays running through the cities plotted
on the map and those cities were then associated with the MSA in which they reside. A highway
passing through a city is counted as having two rays. If a highway terminates in a city, then it

9

Federal Highway Administration website, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm. Last accessed
9/25/2018
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contributes one ray. The number of highway rays in an MSA is the sum of all highways passing
through or terminating in constituent cities.
Validity challenges arise, however, in cross-sectional analysis using the 1947 highway plan
as an instrument. Static, cross-MSA sprawl comparisons must carefully account for ray allocation.
An initial concern is that the highway ray assignment is not as good as random. Cities included in
the 1947 plan were large population centers. Unaccounted for, this alone serves as a violation of
the independence assumption for instrumental variables. Further, variation in population in the
1940s is not a desirable instrument as it is likely correlated with unobserved MSA and other
characteristics unrelated to sprawl that affect health care utilization. Its inclusion in the instrument
induces a violation of the exclusion restriction as planned highway rays could influence outcomes
via pathways other than sprawl.
Conditional on MSA population in the 1940s, however, the number of rays is largely
determined by a city’s geographic convenience. The total number of planned rays does not depend
on the population; rather, it largely depends on a city’s geographic location relative to other cities
included in the highway plan. To illustrate, consider the cities of Los Angeles, California,
Indianapolis, Indiana, and Chattanooga, Tennessee. In 1940, Los Angeles had a population of
around 1.5 million, Indianapolis had a population of under 400,000, and Chattanooga had a
population of just over 125,000. Los Angeles and Chattanooga were assigned four highway rays.
Indianapolis, however, was assigned seven.
Chattanooga is mostly centered between Nashville, Tennessee, Atlanta, Georgia,
Knoxville, Tennessee, and Birmingham, Alabama. It is due to this centrality that it receives as
many highway rays as Los Angeles, which is a hub connecting Modesto, San Diego, Santa Monica,
and San Bernardino. Indianapolis is relatively central to many populous midwestern cities such as
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Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio, St. Louis, Missouri, Louisville, Kentucky, and Chicago, Illinois
among others. This happenstance led Indianapolis to be assigned more rays. It is the variation in
total rays from some MSAs having more or fewer MSAs arrayed around them that this paper seeks
to exploit. Once conditioned on the 1940 population and regional fixed effects, which account for
regional differences in total populous cities, this number is largely random and does not rely on
1940 characteristics of an MSA or its population that are likely correlated with health care
utilization.
Turning from the independence assumption, the relevance and monotonicity assumptions
are simpler to argue. I use a vector of indicators for planned highway rays for each MSA to allow
for non-linear effects and to check monotonicity. The first-stage F-statistics hold steady at ten for
all outcomes and the coefficient on each indicator is positive. This implies that sprawl increases
with the number of rays in agreement with Baum-Snow (2007) and Zhao and Kaestner (2010) and
that the monotonicity assumption is not violated.
The final assumption to be discussed is the exclusion restriction. The number of rays
assigned to an MSA may be conditionally free of undesirable correlations with 1940 MSA and
population characteristics, however, it may have concerning correlations with these characteristics
in 2010. If constructed rays led to changes in MSA and population characteristics unrelated to
sprawl but correlated with preventive care utilization, then the instrument fails the exclusion
restriction. For example, if additional highway ray construction led to a greater prevalence of
billboards advertising preventive care and in turn greater awareness of such care’s value, then
highway rays could affect utilization through population awareness independently of sprawl.
While many such violations would be difficult to test, some possibilities may be more feasible for
testing.
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If differences in highway rays led to differences in per capita park acreage and the use of
parks led to greater overall health from exercise, then the cost of becoming ill could rise to make
preventive care more appealing. If the gain in overall health requires exercise to maintain and
illness prevents exercise, then, while being healthier might reduce the likelihood and loss of health
in illness, there is an added cost of deterioration absent maintenance. If the combined health loss
due to illness and deterioration is greater than the loss in the absence of gains from exercise, then
preventive care is more valuable. This could lead to a change in utilization and a violation of the
exclusion restriction all else equal. I assume that such influences are at most minimal, but their
potential existence should be acknowledged.
2.5 METHODS
To push toward a causal interpretation of results, I use an instrumental variable
specification rather than simple ordinary least squares (OLS). The concern in running a naïve OLS
regression is that some unobserved factors or preferences could influence both where one decides
to live and one’s health care behaviors. Any naively observed relationship between sprawl and
preventive care, therefore, could be the result of an unobserved factor or preference and not reveal
a true causal relationship. The likely endogenous naïve model is as follows,
Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘 + 𝛄𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 + 𝜼𝒁𝒋𝒌 + υ𝑘 + µ𝐢𝐣𝐤

(1)

where Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the probability that individual i in MSA j in census region k has a given
preventive care service in a recommended time frame. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘 is the composite measure of the
sprawl of MSA j in region k. 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 is a vector of individual controls that contains indicators for any
health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, and education category.
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Similarly, 𝒁𝒋𝒌 is a vector containing controls for doctors per 100,000 MSA residents in 201010,
MSA level unemployment, and MSA population in 1940. υ𝑘 is a vector of census region fixed
effects and µ𝐢𝐣 is the error term.
My preferred specification is a two-stage least squares instrumental variable specification
that is as follows
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1: 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗 = 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅𝑯𝒘𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒚𝒔𝒋𝒌 𝜶 + 𝛄𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 + 𝜼𝒁𝒋𝒌 + υ𝑘 + 𝜂𝒋𝒌

(2)

̂ 𝑗𝑘 + 𝛄𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 + 𝜼𝒁𝒋𝒌 + υ𝑘 + 𝜇j
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 2: Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙

(3)

where PlannedHwyRaysjk is the vector of indicators for planned highway rays for MSA j in region
̂ 𝑗𝑘 is the predicted composite sprawl measure. This approach avoids concerns of
k in 1947. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙
endogenous contemporaneous highway placement and pushes nearer causality as the intent of the
highway plan was not to enable health care consumption.
2.6 RESULTS
Table 6 contains the results for the naïve OLS. They largely suggest a standard deviation
increase in sprawl reduces the probability of obtaining timely preventive care; though, only
significantly for pap smears and mammograms. The OLS results also suggest that increased sprawl
significantly reduces the probability of having a personal doctor. They show no significant effect
of sprawl on the probability of being obese; however, the coefficient does have an intuitive sign.
All of the effects are small in size and represent less than two percent of the respective sample
mean.

10

This comes from the Area Health Resource File for 2010.
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Table 7 shows the first stage for the preferred two-stage-least-squares specification. The
instrument is strong with an F-statistic just over ten and shows monotonicity. Table 8 displays the
results for the IV portion of my preferred specification. The effects are similar in direction to the
OLS’s results though mostly larger and significant for flu vaccines, pap smears, sigmoid and
colonoscopies, and obesity. They suggest that, relative to the mean, a standard deviation increase
in sprawl reduces the probability of having a timely colonoscopy by 0.5 percent, a pap smear by
2.1 percent, and increases the probability of having an annual flu vaccine and being obese by 4.8
and 4.9 percent respectively. Significance aside, the results for the OLS and IV specifications
consistently suggest that increased sprawl results in less preventive care use and greater obesity.
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TABLE 6: SIMPLE OLS REGRESSIONS

VARIABLES

Has Doctor

Checkup

Flu Vaccine

Pap Smear

Breast Exam

Mammogram

Sigmoid/
Colonoscopy

Obese

Sprawl (SD)

-0.00672**
(0.00337)

-0.00527
(0.00338)

0.00697
(0.00520)

-0.0137***
(0.00456)

-0.00101
(0.00453)

-0.00757*
(0.00418)

-0.00255
(0.00193)

0.00437
(0.00339)

x
199,784
0.857

x
198,362
0.856

x
195,050
0.468

x
106,204
0.833

x
102,610
0.72

x
76,536
0.821

x
84,863
0.952

x
192,985
0.283

Census Region FE
Observations
Mean

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the MSA level. Control variables include indicators for any health
insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA
population in 1940, and are census region fixed effects.
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TABLE 7: FIRST STAGE OF IV
VARIABLES

Sprawl (SD)

1st Ray

0.451
(0.383)
0.172
(0.211)
1.204***
(0.236)
0.681***
(0.182)
1.485***
(0.282)
1.284**
(0.539)
0.453
(0.290)
1.225***
(0.277)
3.825***
(0.736)
0.644***
(0.223)
0.118
(0.187)
0.488**
(0.188)
-0.651***
(0.208)
-3.49e-07***
(6.11e-08)

2nd Ray
3rd Ray
4th Ray
5th Ray
6th Ray
7th Ray
8th Ray
10th Ray
13th Ray
Census Region 2
Census Region 3
Census Region 4
MSA Pop 1940

F-Stat
Observations

10.12
199,784
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TABLE 8: 2SLS IV REGRESSIONS

VARIABLES

Has Doctor

Checkup

Flu Vaccine

Pap Smear

Breast Exam

Mammogram

Sigmoid/
Colonoscopy

Obese

Sprawl (SD)

-0.00998
(0.00644)

-0.00803
(0.00771)

0.0226*
(0.0118)

-0.0176*
(0.00924)

0.000780
(0.00934)

-0.00683
(0.0110)

-0.00476*
(0.00287)

0.0139**
(0.00663)

x
199,784
0.857
10.12

x
198,362
0.856
10.09

x
195,050
0.468
10.19

x
106,204
0.833
10.19

x
102,610
0.72
10.31

x
76,536
0.821
10.29

x
84,863
0.952
10.54

x
192,985
0.283
10.13

Census Region FE
Observations
Mean
F-Stat

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the MSA level. Control variables include
indicators for any health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA
residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA population in 1940, and are census region fixed effects.
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Robustness
In the data section, changes in MSA amenities due to sprawl were mentioned as possible
pathways to violations of the exclusion restriction. Such changes could also lead to an endogeneity
concern. For example, a change in park acreage could lead to population sorting in which more
health-conscious people choose to live in areas with greater per capita park acreage. These
populations would likely use more preventive care and differences across MSAs could be driven
by population composition. Similarly, if health-conscious individuals prefer sprawled or compact
areas, then population sorting over time could create disparities in health care utilization due to
preference rather than sprawl.
To examine this possibility, I incorporate a specification similar to one used to examine
sorting in Combes et al. (2007). In my specification, two parallel stages lend predicted values to a
subsequent final stage. The first part of the parallel step employs essentially the OLS regression in
which MSA fixed effects are included in the place of sprawl. The second part of the parallel step
is essentially the first stage of the IV which only controls for 1940 MSA population and census
region fixed effects.
The goal of the first parallel stage is to extract the common effect of living in an MSA on
outcomes, embedded in which is the causal effect of MSA sprawl. By focusing on the estimated
effect of sprawl through the MSA fixed effect, I avoid potential unobserved characteristics, such
as individual fixed effects, that could bias results in the simple two-stage IV. Within the individual
fixed effect could be preferences to live in sprawled areas or in areas conducive to exercise or other
healthy behaviors. This specification aims to minimize the influence of such unobserved
characteristics since to be in the MSA fixed effect a characteristic or propensity must be shared by
all residents. It also preserves the easy interpretation of results for a linear probability model.
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The final stage uses predicted MSA fixed effects and sprawl from the two parallel stages
to examine the causal relationship between sprawl and preventive care. The specification is as
follows
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1𝑎 : Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗 = 𝑿𝒊𝒋 𝜸 + 𝜼𝒁𝒋 + 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

(4)

𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1𝑏 : 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘 = 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅𝑯𝒘𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒚𝒔𝒋𝒌 𝜶 + 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝑝𝑜𝑝1940𝑗𝑘 + υ𝑘 + 𝜇jk
̂ 𝑗𝑘 + 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝑝𝑜𝑝1940𝑗𝑘 + υ𝑘 + 𝜂𝑗𝑘
̂ 𝑗𝑘 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 2: 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸

(5)

(6)

̂ 𝑗 is the predicted MSA fixed effect for MSA j in census region k.
Where 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸

̂ j is the predicted value of
PlannedHwyRaysj is the vector of highway ray indicators and 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙
sprawl. In stage 1a MSA population weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at
the MSA level. In stage 1b and stage 2 the unit of observations is the MSA and robust standard
errors. Table 9 shows the results for this specification. The results are similar to the main
specification, however, the instrument is somewhat weaker. While the results may be reassuring,
they do not comprehensively rule out potential concerns.
Further exploration of the endogeneity concern is limited but does also provide a brief
check of the exclusion restriction as well. Using park acreage data extracted from a 2011
publication by the Center for City Park Excellence and The Trust for Public Land, I examine if
planned highway rays led to changes in park acreage per 1,000 city residents (City Park Facts
2011). If more planned rays led to changes in park acreage, then this could induce either unwanted
sorting or the mentioned violation of the exclusion restriction. Unfortunately, only the 100 largest
cities had their park acreage published and many MSAs have multiple constituent cities. Without
knowing the acreage of each constituent city, I could not aggregate this data to the MSA level and
my analysis was limited at the city level.
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Table 10 shows the simple OLS results where park acres per 1,000 city population in 2010
is the outcome and planned rays are the explanatory variable of interest. I control for 1940s
population and census region fixed effects. The results show no significant association between
planned rays and future park acreage. This is somewhat reassuring; though, all possible violations
of the exclusion restriction and endogeneity concerns cannot be ruled out similarly. Nevertheless,
this does lend support to a causal interpretation of the preferred specification.
In a companion check of the sorting concern and the independence assumption, I examine
whether mean 1940 MSA temperature is predictive of planned highway ray allocation. If warmer
or colder MSAs were assigned rays based on how easy or arduous it would be to construct
highways in such temperatures, then rays are not assigned randomly even conditional on 1940
MSA population and census region. Further, given historic temperatures’ correlation with current
temperatures, if planned rays are associated with MSA temperatures, then the sorting concern
arises again if populations sort based on weather. Table 11 shows the results for this OLS
regression. Mean MSA temperature in 1940 is the outcome and I control for 1940 MSA population
and region fixed effects. I do not find mean temperature to be a significant predictor of planned
highway rays. This lends additional support to a causal interpretation of the preferred specification.
A secondary concern to those just explored is the sign on flu vaccines. It is consistently
positive and suggests that increased sprawl leads to a higher probability of vaccinations.
Intuitively, one might expect all preventive service use to decline. However, this increase could be
due to the spread of development increasing access to newly built drug stores and grocery stores
which can administer flu vaccines. If this is the case and sprawl makes it less convenient to visit
medical facilities, then the probability of receiving a vaccination in a traditional medical facility
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such as a doctor’s office, hospital, or clinic should decline while the probability of receiving one
in a store should rise.
To investigate this, I use data provided by the BRFSS on flu vaccine location to create
binary indicators for whether respondents were vaccinated in a traditional medical facility rather
than anywhere else and in a store rather than anywhere else. Table 12 displays the results for two
separate regressions. Each indicator was used as the outcome variable in the preferred IV
specification. Though imprecise, the results suggest that a standard deviation increase in sprawl
reduced the probability of receiving a vaccination in a traditional location and increased the
probability of receiving it in a store.
2.7 DISCUSSION
This work contributes to the literature by adding to an area of sparsity and reinforcing
previous findings. The methods used here have pushed largely correlational literature closer to
causality. In pushing closer to causality, the findings here and those they reinforce increase in
value to policymakers. My findings suggest that urban sprawl tends to reduce the likelihood of
preventive care use, though, very minorly in some cases. Across various specifications, sprawl
consistently had a negative impact on preventive care use, except for flu vaccines. My preferred
results suggest a standard deviation increase in sprawl led to a statistically significant reduction in
the probability of having a timely colonoscopy or pap smear by 0.5 percent and 2.1 percent
respectively. Though imprecise in the preferred specification, across all specifications employed,
sprawl is suggested to reduce the probability of having a personal doctor, a biannual checkup, and
mammograms. The effect sizes are small and consistently negative even if imprecise.
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If forgone screening services lead to higher rates of late-stage cancer or chronic diseases,
then greater urban sprawl likely worsens the overall health of MSA populations, all else equal. A
caveat, however, is that there are many more health care services, including others that are meant
to prevent or treat, which are not considered here. My findings suggest a fairly negative impact of
sprawl; however, it would be ill-advised to extrapolate beyond the scope of what is presented here,
including for flu shots. The preferred results suggest that greater sprawl increases the likelihood
of obtaining a flu vaccine by nearly five percent. A higher probability of receiving a flu shot could
either be evidence of desirable health behavior if independent of all other types of care or
undesirable if it represents unwanted substitution away from other services.
Consistent with other work, I also find sprawl led to increases in the probability of obesity.
Ewing et al. (2003) found that the odds of being obese in a county one standard deviation below
mean sprawl levels were only ninety percent of those for one living in a county one standard
deviation above the mean sprawl level. Vandegraft and Yoke (2004) find that obesity rates rose
with the percentage of developed land. Frank et al. (2004) found an association between increased
mixed land use (less sprawl) and decreased obesity. Zhao and Kaestner (2010) suggest significant
decreases in population density (more sprawl) led to significant increases in obesity. My findings
suggest that a standard deviation increase in composite sprawl, which includes measures of mixed
land use and population density, led to a 4.8 percent increase in the probability of being obese.
A key takeaway is that I do not find sprawl to be preventive care nor obesity neutral. My
findings point to sprawl largely having a consistently negative effect on preventive care. In
conjunction with the wider literature, this suggests that urban policymakers should take health
effects into account when making urban form decisions. My findings continue a trend suggesting
that sprawl has fairly undesirable effects on health. Again, however, I caution against sweeping
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statements as the direction of my flu vaccination results suggests there is more to be considered. There may be possible benefits of
sprawl that will come to light in future research.
TABLE 9. MSA FEREGRESSIONS
VARIABLES

Has Doctor

Checkup

Flu
Vaccine

Pap Smear

Breast
Exam

Mammogram

Sig/Colonoscopy

Obese

Sprawl (SD)

-0.0129
(0.0148)

-0.00454
(0.00290)

0.00448
(0.0141)

-0.0115
(0.0147)

0.00555
(0.0103)

-0.0106*
(0.00617)

-0.00516**
(0.00254)

0.0106***
(0.00220)

Census Region FE
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Observations
204
204
204
204
204
204
204
F-Stat
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
Mean
0.857
0.856
0.445
0.821
0.712
0.814
0.945
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the region level. Control variables include
indicators for any health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA
residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA population in 1940, and are census region fixed effects.

TABLE 10. CITY PARK ACREAGE REGRESSION
VARIABLES
Planned City Rays
MSA Population
1940

Acres Per 1,000 Residents
-1.428
(2.574)
-1.20e-06**
(5.99e-07)

Census Region FE
x
Observations
95
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the state level.
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x
204
6.3
0.277

TABLE 11. 1940 MSA TEMPERATURE REGRESSION
VARIABLES

Planned Rays

Mean MSA Temperature 1940

-0.0589
(0.0424)
1.01e-06***
(2.37e-07)

MSA Population 1940

Census Region FE
x
Observations
205
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1), clustered at state level.

TABLE 12. FLU VACCINE LOCATION
VARIABLES

Traditional Health Facility

Store (Drug Store, Grocery, etc.)

Sprawl (SD)

-0.0317
(0.0237)

0.0179
(0.0193)

Observations
85,679
85,679
F-Stat
10.42
10.42
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the MSA level.
Control variables include indicators for any health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment,
income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA
population in 1940, and are census region fixed effects. Model is linear probability and results should be
interpreted as percentage point change
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CHAPTER III: STRONG SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES IN THE UNITED
STATES REDUCED THE COVID-19 GROWTH RATE11
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A critical question during the COVID-19 pandemic is the effectiveness of the social
distancing policies adopted by US states and localities in bending the curve. Although these
policies take a variety of forms – such as imposing shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs); restricting
dine-in at restaurants; closing other non-essential business such as bars, entertainment venues, and
gyms; banning large social gatherings; and closing public schools – their effectiveness depends
critically on the cooperation of the public. For example, although California’s first-in-the-nation
SIPO carries threats of fines and incarceration, its effectiveness fundamentally relies on social
pressure (Friedson et al., 2020). Compliance with social distancing orders appears to be related to
local income, partisanship, and political beliefs in the US; and compliance with self-quarantines is
related to potential losses in income in Israel (Bodas and Peleg, 2020; Painter and Qiu, 2020;
Wright et al., 2020).
Some epidemiological models forecast the eventual number of COVID-19 cases and
fatalities based on untested assumptions about the impact of social distancing policies in
contemporary society. The widely cited Imperial College model notes the impact of social
distancing measures will likely vary between countries and even communities. In their modeling
of social distancing, they assume all households reduce contact outside the household, school, or
workplace by 75 percent, school contact rates are unchanged, workplace contact rates fall by 25
percent, and household contact rates rise by 25 percent (Ferguson et al., 2020). Another study
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assumes social distancing measures will reduce the average contact rate by 38 percent, based on
evidence from the 1918 influenza pandemic (Thunstrom et al., Forthcoming).
At issue is not whether isolation works to limit the spread of disease, but rather whether
the particular government restrictions designed to encourage social distancing in the US reduced
spread relative to simply providing information and recommendations. Individuals may
voluntarily engage in avoidance behavior, such as hand washing or wearing masks, once they fully
perceive the risks of contagion (Abaluck et al., 2020; Harris, 2020). Critics of government
measures highlight Sweden’s less intrusive response to COVID-19, although Sweden’s strategy is
increasingly questioned (Reuters, 2020).
The literature on the COVID-19 pandemic in the US is evolving rapidly, and at the time of
our writing, we were aware of several working papers using quasi-experimental econometric
methods to examine the consequences of social distancing policies. Recent work examined
mobility and location trends from Google at the state-level and found significant effects of stronger
measures (like SIPOs) on movement using difference-in-differences methods.10 Similar findings
have been found in a study with SafeGraph mobility data (Andersen, 2020), although a different
study using PlaceIQ and SafeGraph data found strong measures were not important (Gupta et al.,
2020). California’s SIPO significantly reduced COVID-19 cases, and a broader analysis of all
SIPOs found increased rates of staying home full-time and reductions in COVID-19 cases
(Friedson et al., 2020; Dave et al., 2020). Other authors used interrupted time-series methods and
found that early statewide social distancing measures were associated with decreases in states’
COVID-19 growth rates, but later SIPOs did not lead to further reductions (Siedner et al., 2020).
Our work – which leveraged both state and county policy variation and used a flexible
event-study method that allowed for effects to vary across measures and over time – estimated the
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impacts of four types of social distancing measures on confirmed COVID-19 case growth rates
through April 27, 2020. The reduced-form approach captures any potential pathways driven by
these mandates, including complementary avoidance behaviors that the public may engage in if
these orders provide an informational shock in addition to increasing social distancing.

3.2 DATA
The unit of observation was daily US county/county equivalents. Although there are 3,142
counties in the US, official COVID-19 records report New York City as a whole rather than
dividing it into five counties, reducing this number to 3,138. Our dataset tracked counties over 58
days from March 1, 2020 to April 27, 2020, leading to a sample size of 182,004. We chose March
1 as the start date because no new cases were reported in the entire U.S. on most days in January
and February. The April 27 end date was chosen to coincide with the first removal of one of four
types of restrictions we analyzed (the re-opening of restaurants and other entertainment facilities
in Georgia) (Georgia 2020). Each county observation was weighted by population using 2018
estimates from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 2019).
We examined the daily growth rate in confirmed COVID-19 cases at the county level,
which originated from the 2019 Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 Data Repository provided by the
Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering. This repository collected data on
COVID-19 cases worldwide from a range of sources including government and independent health
institutions (John Hopkins University, 2020).
The daily exponential growth rate was calculated as the natural log of cumulative daily
COVID-19 cases minus the log of cumulative daily COVID-19 cases on the prior day. We chose
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this functional form because epidemiological models predict exponential growth in the absence of
intervention. Percent growth in cases is identical to percent growth in cases per capita since
reported county populations did not vary during the sample period. The growth rate was multiplied
by 100 and can be read as percentage point changes. In computing the growth rate, we followed a
recent COVID-19 study and added one to the case counts to avoid dropping counties that started
with zero cases (Burstztyn et al., 2020).
The data on the timing of state and local government social distancing interventions was
gathered from a host of sources and made available by Johns Hopkins University (Killeen et al.,
2020). The appendix explains a few corrections we made to the dates and provides a list of stateand county-level policies used in the analysis.
We focused on four government-imposed interventions: SIPOs, public school closures,
bans on large social gatherings, and closures of entertainment-related businesses. For large
gatherings, we used the date of the first prohibition that was at least as restrictive as 500 people.
Most of the bans were much more restrictive: 95 percent of the time (in our population-weighted
sample) the prohibition extended to 50 people. For entertainment-related businesses, we used the
date of the first closure of either restaurant dining areas (including bars) or gyms/entertainment
centers. 96 percent of the time, if one such prohibition was in place, the other was in place as well.
We included control variables related to the availability of COVID-19 tests. The same Data
Repository that provides cases also includes daily counts of positive, negative, and pending tests
in each state on each day, which we added together. To mirror our measure of cases, we converted
this testing variable to the exponential daily growth rate of cumulative tests performed. In the
appendix, we show that the results were robust to the use of other functional forms. Since COVID19 test results are generally not available immediately, we also included the one-day lag of this
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growth rate. Further lags (out to 10 days) were considered but always statistically insignificant, so
we did not include them. Most states did not report any pending tests, meaning that they did not
officially record tests until the results were obtained. This likely explains the lack of a longer lag
between testing growth and case growth.
3.3 METHODS
We estimated the relationship between social distancing policies and the exponential
growth rate of confirmed COVID-19 cases using an event-study regression with multiple
treatments. This approach is akin to difference-in-differences but more flexible, as it interacts the
treatment variables with multiple indicators of time since implementation, thereby tracing out the
evolution of the treatment effects over time (Saloner and Maclean, 2020).
For each of the four policies, we include seven variables: whether it was implemented 1-5,
6-10, 11-15, 16-20, or more than 20 days ago; and whether it will be implemented 5-9 or 10 or
more days later. Implementation on the current day through four days from now was, therefore,
the reference group. If a county never adopted the policy, each of these variables was set to 0
throughout

the

sample

period.

Our

econometric
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specification

is

as

follows

ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 ) − ln(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1 )
5

−1

−1

= 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑐𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑐𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖
𝑖=−2

𝑖=1

5

𝑖=−2
5

−1

+ ∑ 𝛾2𝑖 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾3𝑖 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖
𝑖=1

𝑖=−2

𝑖=1
5

−1

+ ∑ 𝛽4𝑖 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾4𝑖 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑑𝑖
𝑖=−2

𝑖=1

1

+ ∑ 𝛼𝑖 (ln (𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐,𝑑−𝑖 ) − ln(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1−𝑖 )) + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑐 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦_𝑏𝑦_𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜀𝑐𝑑
𝑖=0

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 contains the cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases in county c on day d (with 1 added
to prevent the variable from being undefined when the county does not yet have a case). 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑐𝑑𝑖 is
an indicator for whether a shelter-in-place order was enacted i time periods before day d in county
c, where the time periods are defined as
−2 ≡ 10 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑
−1 ≡ 5 𝑡𝑜 9 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑
1 ≡ 1 𝑡𝑜 5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
2 ≡ 6 𝑡𝑜 10 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
𝑖=
, leaving 0 to 4 days before d as the omitted reference
3 ≡ 11 𝑡𝑜 15 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
4 ≡ 16 𝑡𝑜 20 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
{ 5 ≡ 21 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑 }
range; i.e. the coefficients reflect differences between the predicted growth rate under a policy
enacted i periods ago versus one that will be enacted within the next four days. 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 is an
indicator for whether schools were closed starting i periods before day d in county c. 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 is
an indicator for whether large events were banned (at least as stringent as 500 people) starting i
periods before day d in county c. 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑑𝑖 is an indicator for whether restaurants or
gyms/entertainment centers were closed starting i periods before day d in county c. 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑 is the
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cumulative COVID-19 tests recorded in the state containing county c on day d (with 1 added to
prevent the variable from being undefined when the state has not yet run a test); the summation
term before the log-difference in tests reflects the fact that the lag of the log difference is also
included. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑐 is the fixed effect for county c; this captures unobserved county-level variables
that do not vary during our sample period, which is why we do not control for county
characteristics, such as population density, demographics, or voting behavior, that might influence
case growth rates. 𝐷𝑎𝑦_𝑏𝑦_𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑑 is a fixed effect for day d (ranging from March 1 to April 27,
2020) in the Census Division containing county c; this captures unobserved variables that trend
over time, and allows these time trends to vary by Census Division. 𝜀𝑐𝑑 is the error term for county
c on day d.
An event study model is particularly useful to study the impact of social distancing policies
on COVID-19 cases for two reasons. First, after accounting for the incubation period and time
between the onset of first symptoms and positive test results, such policies likely only affect
official cases after a considerable lag (Lauer et al. 2020). Additionally, the inclusion of variables
reflecting future implementation allows for an analysis of pretreatment trends. Since it is not
plausible for policies that have not yet been implemented to causally affect current cases, finding
such associations could suggest misspecification. For instance, one might expect counties with
rapidly growing case counts to be the most likely to enact these measures, leading to a reversecausal relationship between current cases and future policies that would be detected by our model.
Each policy was implemented at least 10 days after the start of the sample period and at
least 20 days prior to the end. Therefore, each policy contributes to the identifying variation for all
coefficients except those for more than 20 days ago and 10 or more days from now. Since the
estimated policy effects at those two “catch-all” time periods could partially reflect compositional
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changes, they should therefore be interpreted with more caution than the estimates for the other
time intervals.
In addition to the testing controls discussed above, the model also included fixed effects
for geography and time. County fixed effects accounted for the likelihood that, even aside from
differences in policies, case growth rates may have varied due to a number of county
characteristics, including population density and residents’ education, political orientation, and age
(Painter and Qiu, 2020; Wright et al., 2020). Fixed effects for each day in each of the nine U.S.
Census Divisions (522 fixed effects in total) allowed for flexible underlying trends in growth rates
that could vary in different parts of the country, helping to account for the staggered nature of the
outbreak across locations (United States Census Bureau, Undated). We reported 95% confidence
intervals, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by state, the level of most
of the policy variation.
3.4 RESULTS
Descriptive Information
Confirmed COVID-19 cases grew rapidly during the sample period, from just 30 on March
1 to 978,047 on April 27. Appendix D, Figure C.1 shows the number of counties with any COVID19 cases on each day. On March 1, the vast majority of counties had zero cases, and across all
days, 49 percent of unweighted county-by-day observations were zero. However, counties with
zero cases tended to have low populations, so our population weights limited the influence of these
counties on the results. Moreover, in Appendix J, we showed that our conclusions were not
sensitive to handling zeros in different ways other than adding one when computing the logs: using
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which is defined at zero, and estimating separate
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regressions for whether the county had any cases and the exponential growth rate conditional on
having cases (Burstztyn et al., 2020).
Figure 8 illustrates the reach of social distancing policies on the US population over time.
The SIPO was generally the last policy to be implemented, and adoption was uniformly lower than
the other policies. On March 1, no jurisdiction had implemented all four measures. By March 22,
nearly 25 percent of the US population was covered by all the measures, growing to approximately
65 percent by March 29 and 95 percent by April 7, when the last SIPO took effect.
FIGURE 8: U.S. POPULATION COVERED BY SOCIAL DISTANCING POLICIES

Impact of Social Distancing Policies
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Figure 9 illustrates the coefficients (and confidence intervals) for SIPOs and bans on large
gatherings derived from the event-study model. Relative to the reference category of 0-4 days
before implementation, SIPOs lead to statistically significant reductions in the COVID-19 case
growth rate of 3.0 percentage points after 6-10 days, 4.5 after 11-15 days, 5.9 after 16-20 days,
and 8.6 from day 21 onward. Because the model held constant the other types of policies, these
estimates should be interpreted as the additional effect of SIPOs beyond shutting down schools,
large gatherings, and entertainment-related businesses. This additional effect may come from
either the requirement/strong advisement to shelter-in-place aside from “essential” activities or the
accompanying closure of any “non-essential” businesses that remained open. We did not observe
any statistically significant “placebo” effects of SIPOs in the periods prior to implementation,
giving credence to a causal interpretation of our main results. If anything, the pre-trend appears to
point upward, which would make our estimates in the post-treatment period conservative.
We found no evidence that bans on large social gatherings influenced the growth rate. The
point estimates for banning gatherings were statistically insignificant. However, the 95%
confidence intervals included reductions of up to 3-6 percentage points, so the lack of evidence of
an effect should not be misinterpreted as clear evidence of no effect. Also, the lack of a statistically
significant reduction in the post-treatment period could potentially be due to an upward (though
not statistically significant) pre-treatment trend. However, results from the aforementioned event
study with separate variables for each day showed that the pre-trend disappeared four days prior
to implementation.
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FIGURE 9: EVENT-STUDY MODEL – SIPO AND GATHERING BANS

Figure 10 shows estimates for the restaurant-and-entertainment-related businesses and
school closings. Closing restaurant dining rooms/bars and/or entertainment centers/gyms led to
statistically significant reductions in the growth rate of COVID-19 cases in all time periods after
implementation. The estimated effect was 4.4 percentage points after 1-5 days, 4.7 after 6-10 days,
6.1 after 11-15 days, 5.6 after 16-20 days, and 5.2 after 21 or more. Prior to implementation,
policies related to businesses showed no effect on the growth rate, again passing the “placebo”
test.
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FIGURE 10: EVENT-STUDY MODEL – SCHOOL AND ENTERTAINMENT CLOSURES

In contrast, we found no evidence that school closures influenced the growth rate. The
point estimates were never close to statistically significant, but the 95% confidence intervals meant
that we could not rule out reductions of up to 4-5 percentage points.
Adding the coefficient estimates for each policy gives the combined effect of implementing
all four social distancing policies. In days 1-5 after implementation, the bundle of restrictions
reduced the growth rate of COVID-19 cases by 5.4 percentage points. In days 6-10 after
implementation, the growth rate fell by 6.8 percentage points. This reduction grew to 6.8
percentage points after 6-10 days, 8.2 percentage points after 11-15, 9.1 after 16-20, and 12.0 after
21 or more. As discussed previously, the estimate for 21+ days should be viewed with caution, as

64

it did not utilize the same geographic balance of treatments as the estimates for the other time
intervals. A conservative interpretation of these results would therefore be that the impact reached
9.1 percentage points after 16-20 days and appeared to remain at least as high after that.
Counterfactual Simulations
Figure 11 compares the observed growth rate of COVID-19 cases to two counterfactuals:
1) none of the four social distancing measures ever being imposed and 2) no SIPO ever being
imposed. The process for creating these counterfactuals is described in this chapter’s appendix
discussion. The mean exponential growth rate without any interventions was 16.2 percent over the
full time period. The observed and both counterfactual growth rates peaked on March 19, 2020 at
26-28 percent but started to diverge afterward, eight days after the earliest restriction. Without any
social distancing policies, the case growth rate would have stayed similarly high for another week
before gradually falling to 14 percent by April 27, 2020. Without SIPOs – but keeping the other
restrictions – the growth rate would have fallen to 11 percent. The actual growth rate, which
reflects all implemented distancing policies including SIPOs, fell to 3 percent by that date.
Figure 12 compares the reported number of COVID-19 cases over time to the number of
cases predicted by our event-study regression under these same two counterfactual scenarios.
Again, see this chapter’s appendix discussion for details. The graph uses the natural logarithm of
nationwide cases (or predicted cases) for the y-axis scale, but with corresponding numbers labeled
on the y-axis instead of logs.
In all three scenarios, cases increased roughly linearly on the log scale, as expected under
exponential growth, until the last week of March – approximately two weeks after the first
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restrictions and one week after the first SIPO. The actual curve then began to flatten substantially,
eventually leading to 978,047 cases by April 27. In contrast, the two counterfactual curves only
FIGURE 11:OBSERVED GROWTH RATE AND ESTIMATED GROWTH RATES

flattened slightly. By the end of the sample period, the model predicts that cases would
have been 10 times higher without SIPOs (10,224,598) and 35 times higher (35,257,098) without
any social distancing restrictions. Interestingly, the closures of restaurants/entertainment facilities
accounted for a larger share of the reduction in cases than SIPOs, despite SIPOs having larger
coefficient estimates. This is because restaurant/entertainment facilities were implemented earlier
and in more places than SIPOs. With exponential growth, several days can make a substantial
difference.
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FIGURE 12: SOCIAL DISTANCING POLICIES FLATTEN THE CURVE (LOG SCALE)

Robustness Checks Related to Multicollinearity
Our event-study specification included 24 different treatment variables (6 for each of the 4
policies) as well as Census-Division-by-day fixed effects, raising the question of whether there
was sufficient identifying variation to precisely identify the impacts of the different policies. In
particular, this could conceivably have explained the null results for public school closures and
large event bans. Our first two robustness checks, therefore, utilized a simpler specification that
included only a single variable for each policy type: whether the policy was in effect 10 days ago
in the first regression and 20 days ago in the second. (The lag allowed for incubation periods,
testing delays, etc.) Also, we included day fixed effects rather than their interactions with each of
the nine Census Divisions. This means that policy differences across Census Divisions were
allowed to contribute to the identifying variation, whereas the baseline model relied only on
within-Census-Division variation.
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The results are in Table C.3 of Appendix H . We observed the same pattern of results as
we did in our main model: SIPOs had the largest statistically significant effect,
restaurant/entertainment closures had the second largest, and large event bans and school closures
had no discernable impacts.
Robustness Checks Related to Testing

We performed a series of checks aimed to ensure that the results were not driven by the
way in which we controlled for testing. Specifically, we were concerned about two issues. First,
the baseline model’s functional form for tests was the daily log difference in cumulative tests (as
well as its first lag), which mirrored our specification for the outcome variable, effectively
assuming that a given percentage increase in testing corresponded to a given percentage increase
in cases. However, it is possible that the relationship between testing and cases is better
characterized by a different functional form. Second, the number of tests performed depends not
only on availability but also on the severity of the outbreak. The coefficient estimates for the testing
variables were therefore likely biased, and bias could have spilled over to the coefficient estimates
for the policy variables.
Accordingly, we run four checks. The first three use different functional forms for the
testing variables: 1) ln(new tests) – i.e. the log of the difference rather than the difference in the
logs, 2) new tests (not logged) per 1,000 residents, and 3) cumulative tests run to date. The fourth
check simply excludes testing variables completely. The results, presented in Table C.4 of the
Appendix I alongside the corresponding estimates from the baseline model, show that testing was
indeed positively associated with cases, but our coefficient estimates of interest were remarkably
stable across the different specifications. While none of the testing measures are perfect, this
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stability increased our confidence that differential trends in access to testing across counties did
not drive our conclusions.
Robustness Checks Related to Timing
Our next series of robustness checks related to the subjective nature of the start date of the
sample. For our baseline results, we began the sample period on March 1. We excluded prior days
because there were no new reported cases in the U.S. on most days in January in February. We did
not start later in March because using the entire month allowed for ten days prior to the
implementation of any policy with which we could examine pre-trends. However, arguments could
be made for either earlier or later start dates. On one hand, an earlier start date would utilize more
data and allow for a longer pre-treatment period. On the other hand, the earlier the start date, the
more counties started the sample with no cases, exacerbating any potential issues created by adding
one to the log of cases to prevent the outcome from being undefined.
Our first two checks simply started the sample a half month earlier and later: Feb. 15 and
March 15, respectively. The third check used all available data, meaning a Jan. 22 start date. The
fourth check used this longer period but avoided adding one to the log of cases by running two
separate regressions: 1) one with the full sample but an indicator for any cases as the outcome
(linear probability model due to the bias inherent in nonlinear fixed effects models), and 2) one
with exponential growth rate as the outcome, but without adding one to the log of cases when
creating the variable, thereby restricting the sample to counties with cases on both the current and
previous days.12 Next, we return to the original March 1 start date and avoid adding one to the log

12

Note that this is not exactly equivalent to the conventional two-part model, which would use a dichotomized
version of the continuous outcome as the dependent variable in the first part. In our setting, that would mean using
the original outcome variable (with one added to the log of cases), and conditioning the sample for the second part
on having a non-zero growth rate, meaning counties with cases but no growth in the previous day would also be
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of cases a different way: by using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which is interpretable
in the same manner as natural logs but defined at zero.13
Appendix J, Table C.5 displays the results. Across all start dates, we continued to find that
SIPOs and restaurant/entertainment center closures – but not the other two policies – reduced the
growth rate of cases. Interestingly, the results from the two-part specification suggested that SIPOs
reduced COVID-19 spread along both the extensive margin (delaying the arrival of the first case
in the county) and the intensive margin (slower spread once the first case was recorded), whereas
restaurant/entertainment center closures did so only along the intensive margin. The results from
the regression using the inverse hyperbolic sine specification showed this more directly, as those
results were virtually identical to those from the baseline model.
State Inclusion and Other Miscellaneous Robustness Checks
Our next group of checks asked whether results were robust to dropping particular, unique
locations: New York, the hardest-hit state; Washington, the first state to be hit; and California,
which had the nation’s largest population and earliest shelter-in-place order. Appendix K contains
the results, which show that dropping any of these states has little impact on the estimates.
We close with robustness checks related to other miscellaneous issues. First, we estimate
a more fine-grained event study model that included indicators for each day from 10 days before
a policy took effect to 20 days after, rather than grouping them into 5-day increments. Appendix
L Table C.6 displays the results. Not surprisingly, the estimates were less precise than those

dropped. Given these distinctions, it is not obvious to us how one might compute combined marginal effects that
encompass both parts of the model, so we do not do so.
13
For further detail, see John B. Burbidge, Lonnie Magee and A. Leslie Robb. “Alternative Transformations to
Handle Extreme Values of the Dependent Variable.” Journal of the American Statistical Association Vol. 83, No.
401 (Mar., 1988), pp. 123-127.

70

obtained using 5-day groupings, and the wider confidence intervals generally made the results less
informative. In particular, we no longer observed significant effects for restaurant/entertainment
center closures, despite most of the point estimates remaining roughly similar to those obtained
using the 5-day intervals. The confidence intervals included reductions as large as 8 or more
percentage points, making the lack of statistical significance uninformative. In contrast, the
confidence intervals for SIPOs remain smaller, and most of those estimates remain statistically
significant. One useful result from this check is that the apparent upward pre-treatment trend for
gathering bans was concentrated among the first half of the pre-treatment window and largely
disappeared four days before treatment. This increased our confidence that the failure to find a
causal effect of these bans was not due to confounding from pre-trends.
3.5 DISCUSSION
It is important that readers view the results in Figure 5 as a means of illustrating the
estimated effectiveness of social distancing restrictions at “flattening the curve”, as opposed to
literal predictions about alternate histories if policymakers had not taken action. Had they not done
so and COVID-19 had continued to spread in the manner depicted by our simulations, voluntary
social distancing by individuals and businesses would have likely increased as panic over the rising
death toll and hospital overcrowding across the country mounted, offsetting some of the additional
predicted cases. In technical terms, the Census-Division-by-day fixed effects in the later portion
of the sample period would likely have evolved differently. Regardless, avoiding these startling
numbers would have required stringent social distancing in one form or another, whether through
government restrictions or private choices. Economic theory suggests that private choices would
not likely have slowed the spread as much, as individuals’ prevention efforts have substantial
benefits to others (positive externalities) that are not factored into their decision-making.
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Relatedly, testing shortages would likely have prevented official case counts from reaching
the numbers presented in our counterfactual simulations. However, this is largely a semantic
distinction, as these infections would still be severe enough to warrant testing in the absence of a
shortage. If anything, not being confirmed as a COVID-19 case could lead to inadequate treatment.
As striking as our counterfactual estimates are, they still are not worst-case scenarios because they
account for at least some voluntary social distancing. Even without any government restrictions,
Figure 4 illustrated a 14.3 percentage point drop from the peak growth rate to the end of the sample
period. The most plausible explanation is the responses of individuals and businesses to
information about the severity of the pandemic and federal guidelines.
While our results suggest both SIPO and non-SIPO measures can be effective at averting
COVID-19 cases, the lack of evidence of effects of school closures or bans on large social
gatherings is noteworthy. We cannot rule out the possibility that these null results are due to
statistical imprecision, but it is also possible that both policies may displace social interaction
rather than reducing it. For example, school closures may have led families to continue social
interactions outside of the school setting, such as at daycare centers or parks. Google mobility data
through April 5, 2020 show increases of 10 percent or more in visits to parks in 28 states (Google,
2020). A new study finds that schools are only slightly more dangerous than parks and playgrounds
for COVID-19 transmission, supporting this explanation (Benzell et al., 2020). Alternatively,
school closures primarily affect children and the vast majority of children experience mild
symptoms and therefore may not be included in confirmed cases (Editorial, 2020). While
asymptomatic children can pass the virus to adults who become more severely ill, our results imply
that the extent to which this led to confirmed cases did not change when schools were closed.
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Similarly, official group events may have simply been replaced by informal gatherings.
Alternatively, official prohibitions may have been largely redundant since the largest events (such
as college and professional sports) were already being cancelled due to CDC guidance or other
information. Also note that school closures and large event bans occurred prior to the
implementation of SIPOs, meaning substitute types of social gatherings were still allowed. Our
results, therefore, should not be interpreted as a forecast about what would happen if schools were
reopened or certain large gatherings were allowed while other aspects of SIPOs remained in place.
Limitations
There were several limitations to our analysis. Official COVID-19 case counts are known
to understate the true prevalence of the disease, as they do not include asymptomatic carriers, those
who are not ill enough to seek medical care, and those who are unable to obtain a test due to supply
constraints (Friedson et al, 2020). Nonetheless, confirmed case counts are crucial to the Trump
administration’s “Opening Up America Again” plan, which proposed a “downward trajectory of
documented cases within a 14-day period” or “downward trajectory of positive tests as a percent
of total tests within a 14-day period (flat or increasing volume of tests)” as criteria to loosening
social distancing measures (The White House, 2020). Moreover, to the extent that testing shortages
led to only the sickest individuals receiving them, official case counts can loosely be interpreted
as the prevalence of moderate-to-severe illnesses, a relevant metric for policy purposes.
A related caveat is that, ideally, we would like to be able to control more precisely for
access to testing. Available data only allowed us to control for the number of tests performed at
the state, rather than the county level. However, most of our policy variation is at the state level,
so state-level testing should go a long way towards alleviating bias. Additionally, the number of
tests performed depends not only on their availability but also the level of illness in the community,
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making it endogenous. Our estimated policy effects remain virtually identical if we drop the testing
variables (see appendix), providing reassurance that this limitation did not meaningfully affect our
conclusions.
Also, we might ideally want to estimate a richer econometric model. It would be interesting
to trace out the timing of impacts more exactly, study the policies’ interactions with each other or
county characteristics, and examine the impacts of other social distancing policies such as closing
public parks and beaches, the requirement to wear masks in public, restrictions on visitors in
nursing homes, informal state announcements of first cases or fatalities, and federal government
actions such as prohibiting international travel (Gupta et al., 2020). However, it is difficult to
include numerous correlated treatment variables without reducing precision to the point where
statistical inference is uninformative. A robustness check in the appendix illustrates this by
showing that the estimates generally become much less precise than the ones we report below if
we include separate indicators for each day from 10 days before treatment to 20 days after. One
could ask if even our five-day windows were too demanding of the available policy variation, but
other appendix robustness checks show that simpler specifications do not reveal new insights.
Finally, as is typical of observational data analyses, we cannot rule out all possible threats
to causal inference. Numerous possible confounders could vary across time and space, including
the other policies mentioned above, informal encouragement by government officials to wear
masks or improve hygiene, changing business practices, and social norms regarding distancing.
That said, including Census-Division-by-day and county fixed effects in our model and examining
pretreatment trends helped us to push in the direction of causality. We show in the appendix that
the results were robust to the inclusion of county-specific pre-treatment trends, further supporting
a causal interpretation of the results.
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3.6 CONCLUSION
We estimated the separate and combined impact of four widely adopted social distancing
policies. Both SIPOs and closures of restaurants/bars/entertainment-related businesses
substantially slowed the spread of COVID-19. We did not find evidence that bans on large events
and closures of public schools also did, though the confidence intervals cannot rule out moderately
sized effects. Two recent papers on the effect of the same government social distancing restrictions
on mobility found the same pattern of results, suggesting a plausible mechanism (Abouk and
Heydari, 2020; Andersen, 2020).
Our contribution was to provide credible empirical evidence on whether US social
distancing measures worked as intended in flattening the curve. Estimating other important
benefits and costs from social distancing, including the total lives saved and economic harm, was
beyond the scope of our study. Other work has attempted to estimate job losses, simulate effects
on the overall economy and economic growth, or estimate distributional consequences from
current and past pandemics (Friedson et al., 2020; Thunstrom et al., 2020; Scherbina, 2020; Hall
et al, 2020l Greenstone and Vishan, 2020; Correia et al., 2020).
Nonetheless, we provided important information about the benefits of social distancing for
policymakers to consider as they decide on strategies for restarting economic activity. For instance,
our results suggest that returning to partial measures such as school closures and restrictions on
large gatherings, while removing the restrictions that prevent the redirection of social activity to
other settings, would be ineffective in curbing the spread of the virus. At issue moving forward is
whether cases averted simply turn into cases delayed, and a premature return to light measures
would make this more likely.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1: CROSS-STATE EVENT STUDY - COUNT OF ENTRIES PER 100K STATE
POPULATION
Variables
Ever Expanded x 2011

Ever Expanded x 2012

Ever Expanded x 2014

Ever Expanded x 2015

All Doctors

Primary Care

Other Specialties

0.0200

-0.0317

0.0365

(0.2165)

(0.1206)

(0.1097)

-0.0047

0.0219

-0.0274

(0.1626)

(0.0865)

(0.0926)

-0.0639

-0.0905

-0.0422

(0.1084)

(0.0887)

(0.0625)

-0.2598

-0.0979

-0.1780+

(0.2555)

(0.1455)

(0.1054)

-0.2280

-0.1772

-0.0800

(0.3076)

(0.1857)

(0.1320)

State FE

x

x

x

Year FE

x

x

x

240

240

240

Ever Expanded x 2016

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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APPENDIX B
TABLE A2: 5, 10, AND 20 MILE RADII
5 MILE RADIUS
Variables
Ever Expanded x 2011

Ever Expanded x 2012

Ever Expanded x 2014

Ever Expanded x 2015

All Docs (5 mi.)

Primary Care (5 mi.)

Other. Spec. (5 mi.)

1.6806

4.6303

-0.3015

(2.8880)

(3.8421)

(4.4893)

-0.0858

3.2931

-2.4525

(1.6811)

(3.9219)

(2.3592)

7.3972**

5.8144

8.7365*

(2.6298)

(5.2654)

(3.4214)

9.9623**

11.0290

9.7751*

(3.6631)

(7.2478)

(4.3225)

16.0180**

15.1352+

16.6085**

(5.7948)

(8.7538)

(5.9260)

Year FE

x

x

State FE

x

x

12353

17890

Ever Expanded x 2016

Year x Doctor Type FE

x

State x Doctor Type FE

x

Observations

30243
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10 MILE RADIUS
Variables
Ever Expanded x 2011

Ever Expanded x 2012

All Docs (10 mi.)

Primary Care (10 mi.)

Other. Spec. (10 mi.)

1.4864

1.8702

1.2702

(1.8002)

(4.1620)

(2.6823)

-0.6244

-0.7464

-0.7631

(1.3824)

(3.4513)

(1.7984)

3.3059

-0.9717

6.2627**

(2.0864)

(4.2267)

(1.8855)

3.6282

1.2990

5.3685+

(2.5247)

(4.8459)

(2.8503)

5.6478

1.1541

8.5811*

(3.5751)

(5.4068)

(3.3689)

Year FE

x

x

State FE

x

x

12360

17894

Ever Expanded x 2014

Ever Expanded x 2015

Ever Expanded x 2016

Year x Doctor Type FE

x

State x Doctor Type FE

x

Observations

30254
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20 MILE RADIUS
Variables

All Docs (20 mi.)

Primary Care (20 mi.)

Other. Spec. (20 mi.)

1.3386

-1.6270

3.2467

(2.2221)

(3.1000)

(2.2520)

Ever Expanded x 2011

Ever Expanded x 2012

0.0424

0.4133

-0.2586

(1.8196)

(2.5933)

(1.6895)

1.9127

0.1213

3.2514+

(2.2648)

(3.6750)

(1.7011)

2.7150

2.7372

2.9532

(2.4834)

(3.3404)

(2.4928)

3.7445

2.2655

5.1846+

(3.1365)

(4.0849)

(3.0323)

Year FE

x

x

State FE

x

x

12361

17894

Ever Expanded x 2014

Ever Expanded x 2015

Ever Expanded x 2016

Year x Doctor Type FE

x

State x Doctor Type FE

x

Observations

30255

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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APPENDIX C
FIGURE B1: MAP OF THE 1947 INTERSTATE HIGHWAY PLAN

Sprawl Index Factor Construction
The density factor is constructed from measures of gross density of urban and suburban
census tracts, percentages of populations living in low suburban densities and in medium to high
urban densities, urban density based on the National Land Cover Database, and a gross density
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variable similar to the first but derived from data from the Local Employment Database (LED) 14.
The use of the LED means that Massachusetts is excluded from the index as data for that state was
not obtained in the LED. Thus, any conclusion drawn from these measures of sprawl cannot
necessarily be generalized to MSAs in Massachusetts.
The mixed-use factor is calculated from three variables: geography-wide, average jobpopulation balance, geography wide degree of job mixing, and a geography-wide, average Walk
Score. The first two were calculated at the census block group level using the 2010 Census and
LED data at the block level. The first examines the relative ratio of jobs to residents within a given
radius. The second looks at variation in job types by industry in a similar fashion. The third was
calculated from Walk Score, Inc. data and measures the proximity to various amenities and how
accessible they are on foot. Finer detail on the calculations of these variables can be found in the
cited report; though these details are for the county level calculation, the same principles were
applied to MSAs15.
The urban centering factor provides a measure of economic and population centeredness
within metropolitan areas. In their words “urban centers are concentrations of activity that provide
agglomeration economies, support alternative modes and multipurpose trip making, create a sense
of place in the urban landscape, and otherwise, differentiate compact urban areas from sprawling
ones.”16 The variables constructing the centering measure are variation in population density,
variation in employment density17, percentage of the population in the central business district or

Ewing R. and Hamidi S., “Measuring Sprawl and Validating Sprawl Measures”, Report Prepared for the NCI,
NIH, Ford Foundation, and Smart Growth America, (2014) p. 12. Available at https://gis.cancer.gov/tools/urbansprawl/, last accessed 9/25/2018
15
Ewing and Hamidi, Op. Cit. p. 13-14.
16
Ewing and Hamidi, Op. Cit. p. 14.
17
Greater variation around the mean is taken to imply greater centering.
14
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economic sub-centers, and percentage of employment in the central business district or subcenters.
The street accessibility factor is comprised of measures of the average block size
(excluding rural blocks larger than a square mile), percentage of small urban blocks (less than
1/100 if a mile in size), intersection density, and percentage of four or more-way intersections.
These variables are calculated with the use of TomTom GPS data.18 Again, finer detail on the
calculation of these variables and factors can be found in the already cited report. The street factor
offers a measure of how connected and easy to navigate a metropolitan area is.

18

Ewing and Hamidi, Op. Cit. p.17.
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APPENDIX D
FIGURE C1: NUMBER OF U.S. COUNTIES WITH CONFIRMED CASES
Diffusion of COVID-19 during Sample Period
Appendix Figure C.1 below shows the growth in the number of counties with confirmed
COVID-19 cases during our sample period of March 1 through April 27, 2020. These are simple
counts, not adjusted for population. 0.4% of counties had a COVID-19 case on 3/1, but 11% of the
US population lived in those counties. Similarly, more than half of US residents lived in counties
with a case by March 13, even though just 9% of counties had a case. By April 1, 97% of residents
lived in counties with a case, compared to 71% of the unadjusted number of counties.
3000
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3/22

3/29
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4/26

Note: All cases for Bronx, Kings, Queens, and Richmond counties in NY were lumped into New
York county in the source data.
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APPENDIX E
FIGURE C2: EVENT-STUDY MODEL INCLUDING DAY INDICATORS
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APPENDIX F
TABLE C1: EFFECTIVE DATES OF STATE SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Shelter in Place
4/4
3/28
3/31
3/19
3/26
3/23
3/24
4/1
4/3
4/3
3/25
3/25
3/21
3/25
3/30
3/26
3/23
4/2
3/30
3/24
3/24
3/28
4/3
4/6
3/28
4/1
3/28
3/21
3/24
3/22
3/30
3/24
3/23
4/1
3/28
4/7
4/1
4/2
3/25
3/30
3/23
3/24
3/25

No Gatherings of 500+
3/13
3/24
3/17
3/26
3/19
3/13
3/23
3/24
3/25
3/17
3/17
3/25
3/25
3/18
3/13
3/17
3/17
3/20
3/17
3/18
3/13
3/17
3/24
3/27
3/25
3/21
3/28
3/19
3/24
3/24
3/16
3/18
3/13
3/12

Public Schools Closed
3/16
3/19
3/16
3/17
3/19
3/23
3/17
3/16
3/16
3/16
3/18
3/23
3/23
3/17
3/19
4/2
3/18
3/16
3/16
3/15
3/16
3/17
3/16
3/18
3/20
3/19
3/16
3/19
3/16
3/16
3/18
3/16
3/18
3/16
3/16
3/17
3/17
3/16
3/16
3/16
3/16
3/16
3/20
3/23
3/16
3/18
3/16
3/17
3/16
3/18
3/20

3/15
3/29
3/16
3/23
3/16
3/18
3/25
3/14
3/12
3/25
3/24
3/11
3/24
3/17
3/20
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Rest./ Ent./Gym Order
3/19
3/17
3/17
3/19
3/15
3/17
3/16
3/12
3/16
3/20
3/20
3/20
3/23
3/18
3/17
3/17
3/24
3/16
3/17
3/18
3/16
3/17
3/16
3/17
3/25
3/21
3/20
4/4
3/20
3/16
3/16
3/18
3/16
3/17
3/19
3/15
4/1
3/17
3/17
3/23
3/18
3/23
3/23
3/19
3/18
3/17
3/16
3/17
3/24
3/17
3/19

Adjustments for Likely Data Errors
The original county-by-day cases data contained some likely reporting errors. First, the
COVID-19 case counts on Sunday, March 15, 2020 were identical to those from March 14, 2020
in all large counties that had cases at the time, even though substantial growth was reported on
March 16, 2020. This is almost certainly due to lack of reporting on that particular Sunday rather
than a true lack of new cases. We therefore imputed the cases for March 15, 2020 so that growth
from March 14, 2020 to March 16, 2020 was evenly split between the two days.
Additionally, 964 of the 182,004 county-by-day observations reported a reduction in
cases from the previous day, which is implausible since case counts were cumulative.
Approximately half of these were cases where the count increased by one on one day and then
decreased by one the next. In such cases, the original increase was likely an error (e.g. presumed
case that was later found to be negative, duplicate, or person who lived in a different
county/state), so we removed the initial increase so that the case count remained constant over
the three days. We set remaining instances of negative growth rates to zero. As shown later in
this appendix, our results were virtually unchanged if we simply dropped observations with case
reductions as well as all observations on March 15, 2020.
We also corrected some apparent errors in the social distancing policy dates. Many
Kansas counties had reported dates for gathering bans that were after the date for the statewide
ban, so we changed those dates to match the statewide ban.19 We removed the reported SIPO in
Wyoming, which was listed as March 28, 2020, as sources such as the Kaiser Family

19

The counties were Allen, Anderson, Atchison, Barber, Barton, Bourbon, Brown, Butler, Chase, Chautauqua,
Cherokee, Cheyenne, Clark, Clay, Cloud, Coffey, Comanche, Cowley, Crawford, Decatur, Dickinson, and
Doniphan.
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Foundation20 as well as various news articles21 listed the state as not having any SIPO in place
after the date listed. Some school closing dates also appeared incorrect. School closing dates
were checked against those listed at edweek.org22. If there was more than a day mismatch, then a
third source was found to decide the date used, leading to changes for Alabama23, Alaska24,
Iowa25, and Wyoming26. We changed the SIPO start date for MS27 and the gathering ban date for
KY28 as they were incorrect in the source data. The SIPOs for IN, MN, NH, OH, and TN had an
effective start time of 11:59 pm. We changed the start day for these states to the following day as
they were in effect for only one minute on their actual start date. Appendix Tables 2 and 3 below
show the state and county (if different from the state) policy dates we ultimately used.

20

See: https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-address-coronavirus/
See: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/wyoming/articles/2020-03-30/wyoming-governor-still-no-planfor-state-stay-at-home-order, https://abcnews.go.com/Health/9-states-issue-formal-stay-home-ordersamid/story?id=69959039
22
See: https://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/map-coronavirus-and-school-closures.html
23
See: https://www.al.com/news/2020/03/alabama-closes-all-k-12-schools.html
24
See: https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/education/2020/03/16/alaskas-statewide-school-closure-is-about-to-beginno-one-knows-quite-how-it-will-work/
25
See: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/iowa/articles/2020-03-16/iowa-schools-closing-takingcoronavirus-cue-from-governor
26
See: https://trib.com/news/local/education/school-districts-across-wyoming-announce-closures-followinggovernors-recommendation/article_333c5100-c6a6-57f1-b04b-948546b59ffd.html
27
See: https://www.sos.ms.gov/Content/documents/ed_pubs/Exec%20Orders/1466.pdf
28
See: https://governor.ky.gov/attachments/20200319_Order_Mass-Gatherings.pdf
21
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APPENDIX G
TABLE C2: EFFECTIVE DATES OF COUNTY SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES
State
County
Date Issued
State
County
Date Issued
AL Jefferson
3/26
MO Randolph
3/25
AK Anchorage
3/22
MO Ray
3/25
CO Adams
3/24
MO St. Louis
3/23
CO Arapahoe
3/24
PA Allegheny
3/23
CO Archuleta
3/24
PA Beaver
3/28
CO Boulder
3/24
PA Berks
3/27
CO Denver
3/24
PA Bucks
3/23
CO Douglas
3/24
PA Butler
3/27
CO Eagle
3/24
PA Centre
3/28
CO Grand
3/24
PA Chester
3/23
CO Jefferson
3/24
PA Delaware
3/23
CO La Plata
3/24
PA Erie
3/24
CO Pitkin
3/24
PA Lackawanna
3/27
CO San Miguel
3/24
PA Lancaster
3/27
FL Alachua
3/25
PA Lehigh
3/25
FL Broward
3/27
PA Luzerne
3/27
FL Duval
3/25
PA Monroe
3/23
FL Hillsborough
3/27
PA Montgomery
3/23
FL Leon
3/25
PA Northampton
3/25
FL Miami-Dade
3/25
PA Philadelphia
3/23
FL Monroe
3/30
PA Pike
3/27
FL Orange
3/26
PA Washington
3/28
FL Osceola
3/26
PA Wayne
3/27
FL Palm Beach
3/30
PA Westmoreland
3/27
FL Pinellas
3/26
PA York
3/27
GA Chatham
3/24
TN Davidson
3/25
GA Dougherty
3/21
TN Franklin
3/25
GA Fulton
3/24
TX Austin
3/24
KS Johnson
3/24
TX Bell
3/24
KS Leavenworth
3/24
TX Bexar
3/24
KS Sedgwick
3/25
TX Brazos
3/24
KS Wyandotte
3/24
TX Collin
3/24
MS Lafayette
3/22
TX Dallas
3/23
MS Lauderdale
3/31
TX El Paso
3/24
MO Boone
3/25
TX Fort Bend
3/24
MO Cass
3/24
TX Galveston
3/24
MO Clay
3/24
TX Harris
3/24
MO Cole
3/23
TX McLennan
3/24
MO Greene
3/26
TX Tarrant
3/24
MO Jackson
3/24
UT Salt Lake
3/30
MO Jefferson
3/24
UT Summit
3/27
MO Platte
3/24
88

APPENDIX H
TABLE C3: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF SOCIAL DISTANCING POLICIES ON THE
GROWTH RATE OF COVID-19 CASES IN MODELS WITH A SINGLE VARIABLE
FOR EACH POLICY
10-Day Lag
20-Day Lag
Shelter-in-Place Order in Effect
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures
No Large Events
Public Schools Closed

-3.997 (0.705)*
-2.417 (0.726)*
-0.486 (1.020)
1.705 (1.062)

-4.106 (0.631)*
-1.951 (0.797)*
-0.953 (1.136)
0.168 (0.903)

Notes: Sample size = 182,004 county-by-day observations. * indicates statistically significant at the 5% level; + 10%
level. Standard errors, in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. Observations are
weighted by county population. Regressions include the growth rate in cumulative tests in each of the past two days
as well day and county fixed effects.
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APPENDIX I
TABLE C4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS RELATED TO DIFFERENT WAYS OF
CONTROLLING FOR TESTING
Baseline
ln(New
New Tests ln(CumulaNo
Tests)
per 1,000
tive Tests
Control
for Tests
Shelter-in-Place Order
1-5 Days Ago
-1.514
-1.643
-1.641
-1.639
-1.633
6-10 Days Ago
-3.033*
-3.229*
-3.098*
-3.165*
-3.131*
11-15 Days Ago
-4.482*
-4.671*
-4.530*
-4.658*
-4.630*
16-20 Days Ago
-5.950*
-6.155*
-5.977*
-6.132*
-6.104*
21 or More Days Ago
-8.600*
-8.905*
-8.564*
-8.821*
-8.781*
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures
1-5 Days Ago
-4.372*
6-10 Days Ago
-4.710*
11-15 Days Ago
-6.125*
16-20 Days Ago
-5.594*
21 or More Days Ago
-5.177*

-4.415*
-4.805*
-6.151*
-5.595*
-5.149*

-4.349*
-4.751*
-6.088*
-5.588*
-5.156*

-4.500*
-4.878*
-6.293*
-5.861*
-5.500*

-4.335*
-4.713*
-6.031*
-5.539*
-5.135*

No Large Events
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16 or More Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

0.172
-0.061
0.013
-1.041
-1.272

0.264
0.033
0.055
-1.039
-1.269

0.258
0.130
0.144
-0.888
-1.127

0.260
-0.010
-0.053
-1.140
-1.404

0.227
0.125
0.109
-0.933
-1.164

Public Schools Closed
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16 or More Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

0.304
1.004
2.443
3.465
3.095

0.170
0.928
2.406
3.475
3.173

0.002
0.683
2.157
3.179
2.812

0.298
1.149
2.751
3.868
3.591

0.109
0.864
2.432
3.505
3.232

0.010+

0.291*

0.005*

1.235*

--

0.012*

-0.064

0.005*

-0.676

--

Testing Variable for Day t
Testing Variable for Day t1
See notes for Table C.3.
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APPENDIX J
TABLE C5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS RELATED TO SAMPLE START DATES
Start on Start on Start on
Start on
Start on
Start on
2/15
3/15
1/22
1/22; Any
1/22;
3/1;
Cases as Counties
Inverse
Outcome
with
Hyperbolic
Cases
Sine
Only
Shelter-in-Place Order
1-5 Days Ago
-1.144
-0.783
-0.994
-0.024*
-1.045
-1.844
6-10 Days Ago
-2.332* -1.736* -2.028*
-0.059*
-2.117*
-3.456*
11-15 Days Ago
-3.412* -2.652* -2.929*
-0.090*
-2.898*
-4.794*
16-20 Days Ago
-4.517* -3.626* -3.847*
-0.112*
-3.666*
-6.052*
21 or More Days Ago
-6.541* -5.480* -5.536*
-0.143*
-5.239*
-8.727*
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures
1-5 Days Ago
-4.060* -5.779*
6-10 Days Ago
-4.164+ -6.406*
11-15 Days Ago
-5.372* -8.016*
16-20 Days Ago
-4.648+ -7.825*
21 or More Days Ago
-4.067+ -7.849*

-3.936+
-3.952+
-5.081*
-4.302+
-3.683

0.011
0.002
0.010
0.027
0.046

-6.778*
-6.242*
-8.085*
-7.694*
-7.549*

-4.821*
-5.123*
-6.556*
-5.997*
-5.556*

No Large Events
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16-20 Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

0.176
-0.082
-0.012
-1.077
-1.349

0.528
0.185
0.553
-0.317
-0.300

0.213
-0.011
0.089
-0.941
-1.177

0.028
0.036
0.035
0.033
0.030

-1.713
-2.107
-2.300
-3.802
-4.260

0.007
-0.509
-0.302
-1.414
-1.568

Public Schools Closed
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16-20 Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

-0.070
0.231
1.335
2.090
1.495

0.260
0.334
1.137
1.786
1.038

-0.188
-0.0004
1.025
1.732
1.116

-0.062
-0.085
-0.095
-0.107
-0.115

1.909
2.656
3.390
3.851
2.774

1.033
2.153
3.956
5.160
5.032

229,074

138,072

298,110

298,110

93,245

182,004

Sample Size
See notes for Table C.3.
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APPENDIX K
TABLE C6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS DROPPING STATES
Drop NY
Drop WA
Drop CA
Shelter-in-Place Order
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16-20 Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

-1.320
-2.853*
-4.248*
-5.681*
-8.336*

-1.564
-2.987*
-4.616*
-6.069*
-8.776*

-1.475
-2.770*
-4.531*
-5.940*
-8.523*

Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16-20 Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

-4.691*
-5.189*
-6.645*
-6.313*
-5.947*

-4.991*
-5.293*
-6.621*
-6.271*
-5.875*

-5.068*
-5.220*
-6.430*
-6.111*
-5.603*

No Large Events
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16 or More Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

-0.051
-0.414
0.354
-0.388
-0.230

0.483
0.723
0.850
-0.004
-0.050

0.609
0.719
0.700
-0.239
-0.356

Public Schools Closed
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16 or More Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

0.923
1.285
2.500
3.442
2.808

0.644
2.084
3.614
4.851
4.665

0.521
2.368
3.445
4.697
4.398

178,640

179,742

178,640

Sample Size
See notes for Table C.3.
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APPENDIX L
TABLE C7: MISCELLANEOUS ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Bans on
RestauDrop
Fixed
50 Instead rants and
Queseffects for
of 500
Gyms, not
tionable
days since
or
Data
first case
Shelter-in-Place Order
1-5 Days Ago
-1.733
-1.393
-1.402
-2.361*
6-10 Days Ago
-3.189*
-2.800*
-2.912*
-4.176*
11-15 Days Ago
-4.732*
-4.302*
-4.333*
-5.867*
16-20 Days Ago
-6.262*
-5.780*
-5.775*
-7.47*
21 or More Days Ago
-8.871*
-8.351*
-8.383*
-10.414*

Control
for PreTrend

-1.525
-3.038*
-4.461*
-5.888*
-8.438*

Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures
1-5 Days Ago
-4.581*
6-10 Days Ago
-4.905*
11-15 Days Ago
-6.612*
16-20 Days Ago
-6.330*
21 or More Days Ago
-5.970*

-3.797*
-3.068
-4.642*
-3.988
-3.357

-4.144*
-4.427+
-5.740*
-5.159+
-4.666+

-3.218+
-5.351*
-6.575*
-7.109*
-7.092*

-4.407*
-4.762*
-6.186*
-5.656*
-5.221*

No Large Events
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16 or More Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

1.971
1.333
1.451
1.085
0.280

-0.046
-0.787
-0.684
-1.602
-1.800

0.188
-0.073
-0.008
-1.064
-1.316

0.208
0.488
0.643
-0.358
-0.191

0.172
-0.055
0.030
-1.012
-1.218

Public Schools Closed
1-5 Days Ago
6-10 Days Ago
11-15 Days Ago
16 or More Days Ago
21 or More Days Ago

0.649
1.921
3.521
4.882
4.798

0.080
0.736
2.151
3.244
2.881

0.315
0.933
2.367
3.335
2.933

3.207
1.717
1.396
0.641
-0.030

0.356
1.092
2.544
3.567
3.176

182,004

182,004

182,004

182,004

182,004

Sample Size
See notes for Table C.3.
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Creation of Counterfactuals in Figures 11 and 12
In Figure 11, we plot the daily growth rate of COVID-19 cases in the U.S. under three
scenarios. The first is actual case growth rates, which reflect the presence of all four social
distancing measures when and where they were implemented. The second is counterfactual growth
rates when we assume no jurisdictions ever implemented a SIPO but did implement the other
measures the same way they did in reality. Formally, this is done by subtracting out the effect of
SIPOs from the actual growth rate so that
5

𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙1𝑐𝑑 = ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 ) − ln(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1 ) − 𝛾̂1 ∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑐𝑑𝑖 .
𝑖=1

The third is the counterfactual when we assume no jurisdictions ever implemented any social
distancing restriction:
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙2𝑐𝑑
5

5

= ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 ) − ln(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1 ) − 𝛾̂1 ∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑐𝑑𝑖 − 𝛾̂2 ∑ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖
𝑖=1
5

𝑖=1

5

− 𝛾̂3 ∑ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 − 𝛾̂4 ∑ 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑑𝑖
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

Note that we do not also subtract out the “placebo” effects of the future policy implementation
variables, since those are intended to capture unobserved confounders rather than part of the causal
effect of the policies. After obtaining the counterfactuals, we aggregate all three growth rate
variables to the nation-by-day level by weighting each county-by-day observation by county
population.
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Figure 12 builds on Figure 11 to predict the number of cases under each counterfactual scenario.
Note

that

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑

ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 ) − ln(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1 ) = ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠

𝑐,𝑑−1

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑−1 exp [ln (

)

implies

that

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
)].
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
̂
With a predicted growth rate, ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
), this becomes
𝑐,𝑑−1

̂
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑐𝑑
̂𝑐𝑑 ),
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
̂𝑐𝑑 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
̂
exp
[ln
(
)] exp(𝜀
𝑐𝑑−1
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1

(A1)

29
̂𝑐𝑑 ) is the average of exp(𝜀̂
where exp(𝜀
𝑐𝑑 ) in the estimation sample.

Therefore, predicting the number of cases under each scenario requires the estimated
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑

residual from our regression and predicted values of ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠

𝑐,𝑑−1

) under the counterfactuals

discussed above. Each of these estimates is then plugged into equation (A1) to predict
counterfactual cases in county/day observations following the start date of a relevant policy. Prior
to a policy beginning in a given county, the “counterfactual” cases are no different from the
observed cases. Once the number of cases is predicted in each period under a given counterfactual,
we sum the observed and predicted cases by day to create nation-by-day totals for observed and
counterfactual cases. When these sums are presented on a logarithmic scale, as they are in Figure
12, the natural log must be calculated again after summing each variable.

29

Don M. Miller (1984) Reducing Transformation Bias in Curve Fitting, The American Statistician, 38:2, 124126, DOI: 10.1080/00031305.1984.10483180
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This calculation is subject to several technical caveats that together mean the results should
be interpreted as rough approximations rather than exact numbers. There is always uncertainly
with calculations based on underlying parameters that are estimated, and it is difficult to accurately
quantify the amount of this uncertainty. In this particular calculation, errors can compound over
time, as 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
̂
̂𝑐𝑑 is predicted from
𝑐𝑑−1 in equation (A1) is itself an estimate. Even when 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
observed policies and using observed cases in 𝑑 − 1, the predicted value is larger than 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 on
average in our sample. Additionally, the average difference is always positive later in the sample.
To err on the side of caution and avoid having these errors accumulate over time, we discount our
counterfactual predictions based on the average ratio of observed to predicted cases whenever the
predicted cases (based on observed policies) are greater than observed cases on average.
We also err on the side of caution in one other way. When calculating the predicted case
counts for each counterfactual, we set the coefficient on the variables indicating a policy start date
21 or more days in the past (𝑖 = 5 in the summation above) equal to the corresponding coefficient
for 16-20 days. As discussed above and in the manuscript, our sample period includes up to 20
days after each policy. This means there is geographic balance for the variables reflecting up to 20
days, enabling apples-to-apples comparisons. However, the comparability of the estimates for the
21-or-more-day indicators is less clear, as earlier SIPOs remain in that category longer than more
recent SIPOs. It is therefore not clear that the additional effect of SIPOs observed after 21+ days
relative to 16-20 days is a “true” increase as opposed to simply the artifact of the compositional
changes. We therefore make the conservative assumption that the true effect peaked and remained
constant after 16 days. Without this adjustment, the estimated cases with no social distancing
policies rise from ~35 million to ~50 million.
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An assumption that pushes in the direction of overstatement is that the pool of potentially
infectable individuals is fixed over time. This ignores immunity from fighting off the virus. By the
end of the sample period, with nearly a tenth of the US population predicted to have been sick
enough to reach the threshold for a confirmed case, this assumption may not be benign. However,
debate continues over the extent to which exposure to the virus conveys immunity, so the exact
implications of this assumption are not clear.
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